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The U.S. Navy's doctrine "...From the Sea" anticipates that future naval
confrontations will likely occur in the littoral regions of the world in support of
operations ashore. One of the challenges facing naval forces are corvette or light
frigate warships incorporating advanced technologies. In this thesis, a review of
the historical developments of these limited displacement warships is presented.
World War 2 escorts of the Allied forces formed the backbone of many of the
navies which formed after the war. Technological improvements have allowed
corvettes and light frigates to develop from being ships of limited capabilities to
being the "capital ship" for smaller navies.
It was determined that while more countries, particularly Pacific Rim
countries, are producing warships, the number of producers of technologically
advanced weapons and sensors is still primarily limited to the countries of
Western Europe. The anti-ship missile is expected to continue as the primary
weapon, however, its capabilities are going to increase as higher speeds, lower
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis traces the origins of corvette and light frigate-size warships
since World War II, with emphasis on their technological capabilities. Many of
the navies formed after World War II acquired "second-hand" warships from the
established "mature" navies. The ships which were made available were small
compared to the newest ships entering the inventories of the mature fleets.
Because of the level of sophistication available at the time, the larger fleets had
little to fear from this horizontal proliferation of naval capabilities. Technological
improvements, however, have reduced the size of weapons systems while
improving their effectiveness, and this has allowed more military potential to be
placed into smaller ships. Many of the smaller navies are currently engaged in
vertical proliferation, acquiring ships and supporting equipment with
capabilities comparable to the larger fleets.
The introduction of surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and their
incorporation into fast attack craft (FAC) platforms, beginning in the late 1950s,
changed the way that ships were evaluated. These small high speed FACs
became the smaller nations "equalizer" against the larger cruiser and destroyer
platforms of the mature fleets. As effective countermeasures and defensive
systems developed, the popularity of FACs waned.
Ships of corvette and light frigate-size are becoming popular with small
navies. They generally deploy more military potential than can be placed on a
FAC-size platform, and have better seakeeping and endurance. They have been
described as the ideal platform for patrolling a countries exclusive economic zone
(EEZ).
XI
The first chapter introduces the problem and provides an overview of the
questions which will attempt to be answered.
The second chapter traces the acquisition patterns of warships within the
developing world since World War II. A broad overview of acquisition patterns
is presented, and includes: the post-war period, the introduction of cruise
missiles; and the current and projected future trends. In addition, the author
defines corvettes and light frigates.
The third chapter traces the history of these light escort vessels, starting
with World War II. The major classes of British and American light escorts are
compared, and their disposition after the war is followed. The development of
these vessels is briefly analyzed through the periods: 1945-1965; 1965-1980; and
1980-Present. An in-depth analysis is done on the Israeli Navy's Sa'ar 5 class of
corvettes, since it appears to be the most sophisticated and carry the most
military potential of the new warships.
The fourth chapter explores some of the technological innovations which
are, or have the potential of being, incorporated into these small warships. Topic
include: modular equipment and weapons, offensive and defensive weapons;
and techniques for reducing characteristic signatures of the ship.
The fifth chapter looks at the development and availability of electronic
systems and command decision systems. Electronic warfare, radar, electro-optic,
and integrated command decision systems are reviewed.
Some of the conclusions drawn from the research include:
• The level of sophistication of small warships is increasing, mostly due
to the availability of equipment and technology from the Western European
countries.
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• The number of small fast attack craft in the inventories of smaller navies
is expected to remain high, however, many navies will acquire larger corvettes
and light frigate-size ships.
• The concept of modular equipment modules and ships built with a
"fitted-for-but-not-with" approach will become more prevalent. This will make
ships more flexible in their capabilities, and make it more difficult to "know" how




In June 1988, the U.S. Navy completed a study entitled Navy 21. It included
the views of 188 experts on the implications of advancing technology for naval
operations in the twenty-first century. At the time the study was conducted the
Soviet Union was still considered to be this country's greatest political and
military adversary, yet it also predicted that Third-World countries equipped
with sophisticated weapons were becoming an increasingly prominent threat.
Some of the technology "drivers" of future naval forces were predicted to include:
stealth and counter-stealth technologies integrated with electronic warfare
capabilities, advanced communications technologies, ship technologies,
including changes in power plant and power transmission systems, internal hull
design, and major concept variations in hull form. [Ref. l:pp. 6,7,2931]
The Cold War is over, and the United States is confronted with fundamental
questions concerning its role in the new world order. Finding the answers to
these questions is made all the more difficult by a domestic environment that
presses for economic change, especially a "peace dividend." The threat from the
former Soviet Union has diminished considerably and this has led to the current
debate on the purpose, roles and missions of the U.S. military establishment.
The United States government has reacted to the changing events and
threats throughout the world, as well as to the concerns of its people, by
proposing a new national security strategy. [Ref. 2] The naval service has
followed suit with the publication, in September 1992, of a White Paper, "... From
the Sea." This policy document defines a new direction for the naval service, by
emphasizing a shift away from the Navy's post-World War II focus on global
threats to a new, flexible force able to deal with regional challenges and
opportunities. Future conflicts are expected to be joint or combined operations
with naval units operating in the littoral in support of operations ashore. The
shift to littoral warfare brings into focus new challenges and threats. It portends,
among other things, a reduction in battle space, congested shipping routes,
advanced ships and submarines, and technologically sophisticated weapons
systems.
Since World War n, the proliferation of naval hardware among developing
navies has been primarily horizontal, as new states have created new navies.
These newly established navies were initially equipped primarily with surplus
ships from the major naval powers that displayed roughly comparable levels of
technological sophistication. Recently, however, there has been more vertical
proliferation, as the capabilities of existing navies are enhanced, as their roles
multiply, and as they develop their own ambitions and momentum. These
enhanced capabilities include modern diesel-electric submarines, more
sophisticated warships, first-rate electronics, and effective command and control
systems. In addition to the increasing number of countries acquiring advanced
warships and weapons a growing number of countries is able to produce these
advanced systems indigenously.
The ending of East-West tensions has made the possibility that the
superpowers and their allies will fight each other at sea less likely, although not
impossible. More likely is the possibility of superpower and allied navies,
functioning as a coalition, engaging in some form of conflict with Third-World'
navies. The surface combatants which the U.S. Navy might face in future littoral
engagements will likely be smaller than its own, yet with technological
capabilities that will stress much larger combatants. The "capital" ship for littoral
warfare will likely be the corvette. A report by the Center for Naval Analysis
claimed, in 1991, how: ".... the ideal generic surface combatant for extensive
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) defensive requirements would be a large
corvette (FFL) or frigate (FF) size ship." The report went on to describe the typical
weapons load-out for such a platform:
• surface-to-surface missiles (range 50 to 100 nmi);
• a multimission helicopter for ASW, surface surveillance, antisurface
strike (with a short-range antiship missile);
• a medium-caliber (e.g., 76-mm) dual-purpose gun;
• a self-defense high-velocity gun;
• a sonar; and
• ASW torpedoes or barrage weapons.
This combatant would have:
• a maximum sustained endurance of 800 nmi at 25 knots, and
• a maximum cruising endurance of 2,000 nmi at 18 knots. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
A review of major surface warships currently under construction or on
order reveals that the United States and most of the NATO nations continue to
order the largest vessels, in terms of displacement. Most of the rest of the world's
navies acquire warships of light frigate-size and smaller. [Ref. 4:p. 853-855] These
smaller ships are able to devote a larger percentage of their volume to
warfighting and less to sustainability by limiting their area of operations.
Countries such as India, Brazil, Israel, Thailand, Morocco, and Italy, to name a
few, are producing or purchasing ships within this category. Looking at some of
these smaller platforms under construction indicates that advanced technologies,
including stealthy profiles, low probability of intercept (LPI) sensors, satellite
communications, advanced weapons suites, and quieter and more economical
power plants are being incorporated into smaller hulls.
Many countries which previously built their navies around large numbers
of missile-armed fast attack craft (FAC) have come to realize the inherent
limitations of these platforms. Similarly, countries which could previously afford
large, powerful escort vessels are seeking economical alternatives. The current
trend in warship procurement seems to be centered around a multi-mission
escort vessel of "Corvette" or "Light Frigate" size. These versatile vessels are
becoming the "capital ships" of the world's smaller navies.
The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to examine several questions.
One, what are the current and projected surface threats to the U.S. Navy
operating in the so-called littoral regions of the world? Two, what types of
technologies are being or are capable of being integrated into these surface ships?
And three, how is the world market for these technologies changing?
A. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
While examining the threat to U.S. naval operations posed by
technologically advanced warships of corvette or light frigate-size, this thesis
addresses the technologies associated with weapons, hull design, electronic
sensors, and command and control systems which are currently, or have the
potential of, being incorporated into platforms of this size.
Anti-ship missile-equipped platforms are the principal focus of interest.
Gun and/or torpedo-armed Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and Fast Patrol Boats (FPB)
are looked at in the context of their wide distribution and inherent limitations.
For the purpose of this thesis, the term Corvette refers to an anti-ship missile-
equipped warship of between 600-1,500 tons, full load displacement. A Light
Frigate refers to an anti-ship missile equipped warship of between 1,500-2,500
tons, full load displacement.
This thesis also examines the trends in warship acquisition among the
newly developed countries after World War II, from the introduction of anti-ship
cruise missiles in the 1960s to the present. A review of corvette and frigate-size
vessels in the U.S. and British navies during and since World War II is included
for historical perspective.
B. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The approach used in this thesis is to first examine the material
development of Third World navies since World War n, including the role the
anti-ship cruise missile has had in this development. An in-depth examination of
the past, current, and future capabilities of corvette /light frigate-size warships is
next. The main focus is on weapons, sensors, electronic support
measure/electronic countermeasure (ESM/ECM) systems, command and control
systems, and signature management techniques. The purpose is to determine the
extent of development and proliferation of technological sophistication in
regards to these systems.
II. WARSHIP ACQUISITION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
The navies of the United States and her allies have, since World War II,
developed forces and strategies with the primary goal of containing the Soviet
threat. These forces have primarily been large in terms of ship displacements,
and powerful in terms of capabilities. While the superpowers focused on
countering each other, many other countries established and expanded their
naval capabilities. This chapter will explore the establishment of these infant
navies, the effect of the introduction of anti-ship cruise missiles, and future
acquisition trends.
A. POST WORLD WAR II
The period of de-colonization after World War II was accompanied by a
horizontal proliferation of naval capabilities. Naval technology trickled
downward as newly independent nations took advantage of the huge surplus of
warships that became available after the war. The United States, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union transferred large numbers of combatants through low-cost
sales, leases, or outright donation. Additionally, a portion of the surviving fleets
of the defeated Axis powers was distributed to other nations. As a result,
between 1947 and 1960, some 1,230 naval ships and submarines were handed
over to 55 nations. [Ref. 5:pp. 172-203] The United States was by far the largest
provider of surplus vessels, reportedly selling, leasing, or transferring 611 ships
and submarines during the 13 year period. [Ref. 5:pp. 172-203] The Soviet Union
transferred 322 vessels, Great Britain and France, 167 and 42, respectively. [Ref.
5:pp. 172-203] Many of these vessels that became the backbone of the new navies
were wartime U.S. destroyers (DD) and destroyer escorts (DE), and British
corvettes and frigates.
1. Infant Navies
The disintegration of colonial empires after World War II produced a
host of newly independent states. Although not quite as urgent a task as the
establishment of a land-based militia, most of them regarded the establishment of
a navy as a necessary concomitant of national sovereignty. Figure 1 documents
the growth of independent Third-World states and relates it to the growth of
Third-World states with navies.
During the first 20 years or so after World War II the level of
technological capability of most warships in the inventories of the developing
countries was limited compared with that of the navies of the United States and
her allies. Additionally, most warship construction was still limited to very few
countries, notably Great Britain, the United States, France, the Soviet Union, Italy,
and West Germany.
2. The Introduction of Cruise Missiles
The introduction of compact cruise missiles into the Soviet fleet in the
late 1950s set the stage for a new phase in naval development that particularly
benefited the nascent navies of the Third World. The anti-ship missile became the
"poor man's" counter to the heavily armed aircraft carriers and cruisers of the
mature fleets. Capable of being fitted into small displacement hulls, the weapon
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1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
Year
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Sources and Methodology: Chronological growth of Third-World independent
states was derived from successive issues of Europa Yearbook. Chronological
growth of Third-World states with navies was derived from successive issues of
Jane's Fighting Ships. Third-World states have qualified for listing in jane's when
some kind of formal naval organisational structure is established and when at
least a modicum of naval vessels is acquired, such as several patrol craft.
Source: Morris, M.A., Expansion of Third World Navies, p. 7
Figure 1: Growth of Third-World States and Navies
calculated, in much the same way as the introduction of the torpedo had done
nearly one century before. Traditionally, a combatant's firepower had been
equated to its displacement — the heavier a ship, the greater its firepower. Now,
small high-speed craft were given the wherewithal to cripple or sink much larger
(and more expensive) warships, from greater ranges than had been possible with
torpedoes.
a. Early Developments
After World War II, the Soviets undertook an intensive program
of missile development with the intention of creating a range of weapons across
the tactical and strategic spectrum. In the late 1950s, this program began to yield
useful results in the field of surface-to-surface anti-ship missiles (SSMs), and the
first Soviet cruise missile was placed in service some four years before its
Western equivalents. The first such type to reach operational status was the SS-
N-l Scrubber, which entered service in 1958. [Ref. 6:p. 15] Its large size limited its
service to destroyer-size platforms, however.
b. Introduction of Styx Missiles
The first practical weapon in terms of size was the considerably
smaller SS-N-2 Styx. It can truly be said to have revolutionized naval warfare.
Spanning 2.75m (9ft 0.25in) and measuring 6.3m (20ft 8in) in length, the Styx
weighed 3,000kg (6,6141b) with a 500kg (1,1021b) high-explosive warhead. It had
a theoretical maximum range of 85km (52.8 miles) at a speed of l,100km/h
(684mph). [Ref. 6:p. 16] The full range could only be usefully employed if mid-
course updating of the guidance package were provided by a supporting
platform within radar range of the missile and target (an unlikely contingency in
this period). Therefore, the effective range was 37km (23 miles), i.e., horizon-
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range. A cruise altitude of up to 300m (985ft) was preset prior to launch and the
missile flew under the control of an autopilot with an active radar taking over
during the terminal phase of the attack. [Ref. 6:p. 16]
c. Early Platforms
The Soviets converted simple torpedo craft into launch platforms
for the SS-N-2 missiles, with a total of about 100 Komar class vessels being
produced. The Komars, at almost 27 meters in length and 75 tons (full load
displacement), carried just two SS-N-2A Styx SSMs. [Ref. 6:p. 79] Of these, some
78 were later transferred to the navies of satellite and client countries. China
produced another 110-plus copies, and named it the Hegu class. [Ref. 6:pp. 79-80]
Even as the first of the Komars entered service, the Soviets were building an
improved successor, known as the Osa class. These craft were the first purpose-
built missile armed FACs with double the missile armament of the Komars and a
considerably more seaworthy hull design. [Ref. 6:p. 122] The first unit of this
class was laid down in 1959 or 1960 and entered service in 1961. Production
continued up to 1970 and amounted to some 289 craft (175 Osa I and 114 Osa II,
excluding more than 100 built in China as the Huangfeng class. [Ref. 6:pp. 120-
122] These vessels served in all four of the Soviet fleets, but over a period of years
many were transferred to the navies of satellite, allied and client states.
d. First Kill
The destructive potential of these small high speed craft was
demonstrated before the world on 21 October 1967, when the Israeli destroyer
Eilat was hit and sunk by Styx missiles launched from two Komar-class craft of
the Egyptian navy. This was the first occasion in which a ship-launched SSM had
sunk another warship. [Ref. 7:p. 181] The result was the 'missile-fever' of the late
11
1960s. For nations with large navies, this was a dangerous threat which they
were illprepared to handle. For poorer nations, it provided a tremendous
opportunity to upset the traditional naval balance. By 1971, many navies,
including those of Norway, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Greece,
Algeria, China, Malaysia, Brunei, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, East Germany,
Indonesia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Syria, and Libya had fleets of these
small cruise missile boats. [Ref. 8:p. 133]
e. Overall Effort
Since the Styx, cruise missiles have been developed by a number
of nations other than the Soviet Union, notably the United States, France, Israel,
Italy, Norway, and China. They have been exported in huge numbers throughout
the world, are capable of being launched from ships, submarines, planes, and
trucks, and can be configured to attack targets at sea or on land. Table 1 lists the
estimated total numbers of sea launched SSMs imported by selected countries as
of 1991.
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TABLE 1: INVENTORIES OF IMPORTED SEA LAUNCHED SSMs
HELD BY SELECTED COUNTRIES
Eastern Mediterranean
Egypt 300 Styx, Harpoon, Otomat
Greece 250 Exocet, Harpoon, Penguin
Israel 150 Gabriel*, Harpoon, Sub-Harpoon
Libya 300 Styx, Otomat
Syria 300 Styx
Tunisia 100 Styx, Exocet
Turkey 200 Harpoon, Penguin
Arabian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean
Bahrain 50 Exocet
India 250 Styx
Iran 200 Styx, Exocet (Harpoon or Sea Killer?)
Iracj and Kuwait 400 Styx, Exocet
Oman 80 Exocet
Pakistan 100 Styx, Harpoon, Sub-Harpoon
Qatar 50 Exocet
Saudi Arabia 400 Harpoon, Otomat
United Arab Emirates 100 Exocet
Yemen 100 Styx
Northwestern Pacific
China 100 Styx*, Exocet*
Japan 1,000 Harpoon, Sub-Harpoon
North Korea 300 Styx
South Korea 300 Exocet, Harpoon
Taiwan 1,000 Gabriel*, Harpoon, Otomat
Note: Numbers are approximate and may include orders not yet filled.
An asterisk (*) indicates that a country can produce the missile domestically.
fSource: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Database.1, Cited in
Arnett, E.H., Sea Launched Cruise Missiles and U.S. Security, (Praeger Publishers,
1991), p. 98
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B. CURRENT AND PROJECTED TRENDS
1. The World Since 1989
Since 1989, political and military tensions between the superpowers
have eased. Many of the West's developed nations have begun reducing their
naval strength to meet perceived peacetime needs. If the trend that followed
World War II is repeated, some ships from these navies will be transferred to the
navies of less affluent nations. This will result in a further diffusion of naval
power. At the same time, many of the long-time "recipient" nations are electing to
purchase new ships, designed and built to their individual requirements, rather
than to continuing to "make-do" with hand-me-downs that, though cheaper,
have commonly proved ill-suited to local circumstances.
2. Limitations of FACs and FPB's
The FAC and more lightly armed and slower Fast Patrol Boats (FPB)
have become the centerpiece of many of the smaller navies. Yet, since the missile
fever of 20 years ago, it has been recognized that these vessels have several
important limitations, including:
• the complexity of combat systems, per ton of displacement, makes these
vessels very expensive to operate and maintain;
• because of their limited payload, FACs and FPBs cannot be multi-mission
ships, most being limited to a surface strike role;
• because of their relatively small size, they have a generally poor
seakeeping capability;
14
• because of poor seakeeping, small crew size, and propulsion plants
which cannot be operated at low power for long periods, these platforms have
poor endurance;
• they have very poor survivability against modern anti-ship weapons,
which have very high hit probabilities;
• because of their complex systems, and the need for highly skilled
manpower and unique test equipment, they are often difficult to operate and
maintain; and
• limited or non-existent long-range detection capabilities greatly limits the
effective range of anti-ship missiles. [Ref. 9:p. 10]
These limitations and the ability of the large anti-ship missile armed
combatants of the mature fleets to out-range the smaller FACs and FPBs by
utilizing shipboard helicopters have prompted a decline in the number of
missile-armed FACs entering service: from 112 between 1982-86 down to only 33
during the period 1987-92. [Ref. 10:p. 27]
As Michael Morris points out in Expansion of Third World Navies , the
corvette is the next logical acquisition for a navy which is interested in expanding
its capabilities beyond FACs without purchasing larger and more expensive
frigate-size hulls. "Corvettes", writes Morris, "having larger hulls and more
weapon systems than FACs, have greater range, sea-keeping and combat
capabilities." [Ref. ll:p. 40] They are an excellent choice for Morris' Rank 3
(inshore territorial defense) navies because of their flexibility and cost
effectiveness. Additionally, they provide a low-end capability for larger navies
interested in procuring a "high-low" mix of capabilities.
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3. Defining Corvettes and Frigates
Ship classifications are made based on size or displacement, the type
or size of armament, and sometimes, based on intended mission(s). It is quite
common for different countries and professional publications to classify the same
vessel quite differently. The Glossary of Naval Ship Types (GNST) is the
Department of Defense (DoD) standard for classifying and typing non-U.S. naval
ships and craft. According to the GNST, a corvette (FFL) is defined as:
"A surface warship less capable than a frigate but more capable than a
patrol combatant (e.g., generally between 1,000 and 1,500 metric tons, full
load displacement). Capable of limited operations on the open ocean, but
primarily designed to operate nearer the littoral than frigates. Distinguished
from Patrol Ships (PS) by sustained speed capability greater than 20 knots."
The editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, an industry and military standard,
defined a corvette in 1975 as a major surface ship with a full load displacement of
between 500 and 1,100 metric tons. [Ref. 12:p. 105] Other respected military
references have similar definitions, although none are exactly the same. The
GNST, for example defines a frigate (FF) as:
"A surface warship generally with weapons and associated sensors,
optimized for one principal warfare discipline. Frigate capabilities in other
warfare roles are primarily for self-defense purposes, although there are
modern warships described as "general-purpose frigates" which can
function in many ways as destroyers. Should have sufficient endurance and
seaworthiness to enable open-ocean deployments. In the absence of
information to the contrary, this requirement is assumed to be met if full
load displacement (FLD) is equal to or greater than 1,500 metric tons. To
distinguish from PS, must be capable of sustained speeds of over 20 knots.
Currently, frigates vary from 1,500 to over 5,000 metric tons FLD."
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Because of the sophistication and size of modern weapons and
sensors, frigate- size vessels can have multi-mission capabilities. Generally,
however, larger vessels are more likely than smaller vessels to be configured for
multi-mission operations.
The definitions which will be utilized for the remainder of this paper
will be:l
Corvette: a warship armed with anti-ship missiles, whose full load
displacement is between 600-1,500 tons. Must be capable of sustained
speeds of over 20 knots.
Light Frigate: a warship armed with anti-ship missiles, whose full load
displacement is between 1,500-2,500 tons. Must be capable of sustained
speeds of over 20 knots.
4. Current Warship Programs
A snapshot look at the types and sizes of major surface warships on
order as of August, 1991 reveals that so called light frigates and corvettes
predominate outside NATO. These countries include Argentina (two-1,680 ton
frigates), Brazil (three-1,966 ton frigates), India (six-1,350 ton corvettes), Israel
(three-1,275 ton corvettes), Italy (two-1,285 ton corvettes), Morocco (two-2,000 ton
frigates), South Africa (six-2,000 ton frigates), and Thailand (four-1,900 ton
frigates, two-2,000 ton frigates). [Ref. 4:pp. 853-855] The vessels on order appear
to be a compromise between the larger, more expensive destroyer-type designs
that are the core of the fleets of the mature navies, and the smaller less capable
FAC/FPB designs that predominated among the emerging navies during the
1970s. These vessels will serve as the flagships for many of the smallest navies in
1 The dividing line of 1,500 tons between corvettes and light frigates was chosen arbitrarily. The
author's interest is in warships between FAC-size and Western frigate-size.
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which they are acquired, and will provide an economical patrol /escort capability
for the larger navies.
5. What the future holds
FAC have steadily increased in size, so that vessels of 450-500 tons, or
more, are not uncommon. Most, however, remain limited in their capabilities,
being designed and equipped primarily as surface strike platforms. The
limitations of the standard FAC-size hull will accommodate only so much
additional weight and space, particularly weight placed up high. The solution for
many navies is to "upgrade" to corvette and light frigate-size vessels, which can
provide most of the capabilities of larger frigates hulls. Their greater
displacement allows additional offensive and defensive weapons, expanded EW
equipment, a comprehensive command and control suite, and helicopter
facilities. They are able to carry war-making capabilities not much different from
those found on larger vessels by sacrificing range and endurance. Ships of this
size have nevertheless the kind of endurance that is sufficient in peacetime to
underwrite the vastly expanded claims to national control that have come with
the establishment of EEZs. In war, they could act as a squadron leader for smaller
FACs, or conduct local anti-submarine or surface strike missions.
The next chapter will trace the history and development of these light
warships, from World War II till the present. It is important to understand how
these ships of modest capabilities, produced in large numbers, were utilized both
during the war and since. The chapter will conclude with a comparison of some
of the latest corvette /light frigate designs, and a review of the most heavily
armed current warship, the Sa'ar 5 class, in this category.
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III. HISTORY OF CORVETTES/LIGHT FRIGATES
Corvette and light frigate-size vessels have undergone significant changes
since World War n. Advancements in weapon capabilities and the development
of sophisticated electronic systems have allowed ships of limited displacement to
develop into the "capital ships" of smaller navies. This chapter will trace the
history of these vessels of limited size from World War II to the present in order
to understand how technology has affected their roles, missions, and capabilities.
A. WORLD WAR II
The requirement to convoy large amounts of material and personnel across
the Atlantic and Pacific during World War II necessitated the building of many
patrol and escort vessels. These ships were primarily built by the British,
Canadians, and Americans. They performed a variety of functions during and
after the war years besides their primary role as escorts. These included assault
and anti-submarine operations, as well as radar picket and personnel transport
duties. [Ref. 13]
1. British Corvettes and Frigates
The British government ordered a total of about 700 escort vessels
between 1939 and 1945. Two corvette and two frigate designs were built,
including the Flower and Castle classes of corvettes, and the River and Loch
classes of frigates. These vessels, primarily built by shipbuilders not usually
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engaged in warship construction, were designed to first-class mercantile
standards. This ensured that large numbers could be built cheaply by merchant
shipyards, thus freeing the traditional naval builders to concentrate on
"conventional" warships. They were principally armed with depth charges for
use against submarines, and with various small and medium caliber guns for use
against aircraft and small surface targets.
In addition to their own designs, the British ordered, under the Lend-
Lease program, over 300 U.S. -built destroyer escorts (DEs). Seventy-eight
American DEs, including 32 Evarts class and 46 Buckley class, were completed
and transferred during the course of the war and became known in the British
Navy as the Captain class. [Ref. 13:p. 7]
Table 2 lists the leading particulars of the four classes of British-built
escorts used during World War II. Table 3 shows the disposition of many of these
ships after the war. The data on the Captain class of ships is contained in Table 4,
along with that for the other American-built DEs. These ships and their
American counterparts became the building blocks for the new post-war navies.
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TABLE 2: WORLD WAR 2 BRITISH ESCORTS
Item Corvettes Frigates
Flower Class Castle Class River Class Loch Class
Length, B.P. 190 ft. 225 ft. 283 ft. 286 ft.
Beam, molded 33 ft. 36 ft. 6 in. 36 ft. 6 in. 38 ft. 6 in.
Depth molded to
upper deck
17 ft. 6 in. 17 ft. 6 in. 17 ft. 6 in. 17 ft. 9 in.
Load displacement,
tons
1,170 1,580 1,865 2,260
Oil fuel storage, tons 200 480 440 724
Propelling machinery
H.P.
2,750 2,750 5,500 5,500
Speed, knots 16 16.5 20.5 19.5
Source: Baker, R., and others, Selected Papers on British Warship Design in
WWII: From the Transaction of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects. 1983,
p. 85.
2. U.S. Escorts
Shortly after the European war started in 1939, the U.S. Navy
recognized the British Navy's shortage of ocean escorts. Fearing that the United
States, too, might be drawn into the conflict, the Navy established its own need
for vessels of this type. In addition to the 300 escorts ordered by the British Navy
by the spring of 1942, hundreds more were laid down for the U.S. Navy.
Ultimately, over 1,000 DEs were ordered, with over 550 completed. [Ref. 13:p. 6]
Of these, some 475 were commissioned into the U.S. Navy, including 94 that
were used as fast troop transports (APDs). [Ref. 13: p. 6]
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The U.S. built six main DE classes. Their respective numbers and
specifications are listed in Table 4. It can be seen that the differences between
classes, other than in main propulsion, were largely confined to main and close
armament.
TABLE 3: TRANSFERS OF BRITISH AND CANADIAN ESCORTS TO
OTHER NAVIES
Nation Designation Ships Year of Transfer
Argentina River class 1 1948
Chile River class 2 1946
Chile Flower class 3 1946
China Castle class 2 1947
China Flower class 3 1949
Egypt Flower class 2 1948-49
Egypt River class 3 1947-48
Iran Loch class 1 1948-49
Ireland Flower class 3 1945-46
Israel Flower class 2 1949-50
Israel River class 4 1949-51
Italy Flower class 1 1949
Malaysia Loch class 1 1962-64
New Zealand Loch class 6 1947-49
Norway River class 3 1956
Peru River class 2 1947
Portugal River class 2 1948-49
Taiwan Castle class 2 1947-51




















































































































































After the war, many DEs underwent experimental alterations or full
conversions. Produced were Radar Picket Ships (DERs), Amphibious Control
Ships (DECs), Floating Power Stations, Experimental Destroyer Escorts (EDEs),
and Destroyer Escort Anti-Submarine (DE(A/S)). This wide range of
reconfigurations pointed the way to the many different arms "packages" that
could be built into a small, well designed surface ship. 1
2. Transfers of World War II Escorts
In addition to the 78 U.S. DEs sent to the British Navy, 12 others, six
each to France and Brazil, were transferred during the war. After the war a
further 81 DEs were transferred to 18 other navies. Table 5 lists the countries,
numbers, and years of transfer. These vessels, along with other reserve ships
from both the American and British fleets, became the backbone of many smaller
navies. At the time, they were a bargain on many counts for the following
reasons:
• acquisition cost was very low or none;
• the ships provided a multi-mission capability, with weapons and sensors
that were state-of-the-art at the time;
• seakeeping qualities were adequate;
• survivability against existing anti-ship weapons, i.e. guns, was
reasonable; and
^For additional details on DE conversions refer to Destroyer Escorts, p. 15-48.
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• maintenance and operation were relatively easy thanks to standardized
spare parts and a minimum of electronics requiring specialized personnel
training and test equipment.
As long as the supplier nations still operated their own wartime DEs,
the world's new navies could count on a reliable source of replacement parts.
This began to change in the early 1960s.
TABLE 5: TRANSFERS OF USN DEs TO OTHER NAVIES
Nation Ships Year of Transfer
Brazil 8 1944-6, 1945-1, 1946-1
Chile 4 1967-4
Colombia 4 1945-1, 1965-1, 1968-1, 1969-1
Equador 1 1967-1







19 1945-1, 1946-1, 1948-4, 1960-1, 1966-9, 1967-2,
1968-1
Netherlands 6 1950-3, 1951-3
Peru 3 1951-3
Philippines 2 1961-1, 1968-1
Portugal 2 1968-2
South Korea 12 1956-2, 1959-1, 1963-1, 1966-2, 1967-5, 1968-1
South Vietnam 2 1971-2
Thailand 1 1959-1
Uruguay 2 1951-1, 1952-1
Source: Elliott, P., American Destroyer Escorts of WWII, p. 57
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3. Corvette/Light Frigate Programs 1945-1965
During the first two decades or so after World War II, the traditional
navies had little need for new escort vessels of corvette or light frigate size. DE
inventories declined steadily as wartime vessels found new "homes" in the Third
World, and the older fleets concentrated their acquisition programs on larger
platforms. By 1965, however, a number of countries purchased new warships of
light displacement to replace or supplement their existing inventories. These
included: Britain, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USSR, and Venezuela. Most of
these ships were built by Britain, France, Italy, Spain and the USSR. The latter
was by far the largest producer of small escorts during this period, completing 60
Riga class frigates, 12 Kola class, 25 Petya class, and five Mirka class. [Ref. 14]
They were lightly armed and optimized for anti-submarine warfare duties. The
1965-66 edition of Tane's Fighting Ships listed only one shipyard as producing
"corvettes", and 10 as producing "escort vessels".
4. Corvette/Light Frigate Programs 1965-1980
In 1980, lane's Fighting Ships listed 22 shipyards as producing
"corvettes"; 18 yards were listed as building "escort vessels". Additionally, the
number of countries which had acquired new corvette /light frigate hulls since
1965 totalled 30. They were Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, East
Germany, Ecuador, Finland, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, North
Korea, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
Spain, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.
Many of these countries had acquired more than one class of light escorts during
the intervening 15 years, and a few had secured ships from both sides of the Iron
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Curtain. Most of the new classes were equipped with SSMs, yet retained their
ASW capabilities in the form of sonar, torpedoes, and mortars. Also, many more
classes of ships in the 600-2,500 ton displacement range were being fitted with
helicopter decks, and a few types were armed with short-range surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs). Finally, by 1980, 13 of the 30 countries that bought new
corvettes/light frigates classes did so while relying entirely or in part on
domestic production.
5. Corvette/Light Frigate Programs 1980-Present
The 1993-94 edition of lane's Fighting Ships lists just 13 shipyards as
building "corvettes", down from 22 in 1980. No yards were listed as producing
"escort vessels" but, the category of "frigates (light)" was added. This shift in ship
designations reaffirms the problem associated with trying to compare vessels,
based on formal classification only. This type of vessel has become very popular,
and new designs continue to flood the market. Table 6 lists the specifics of some
of the most recent designs which are being built or proposed. Since 1980, 26
countries have acquired or have ordered new corvette or light frigate-size
warships. SAMs have become more common, as have helicopter decks and, in
some cases, helicopter hangers. Most are also equipped with some sort of
electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic counter measures (ECM)
equipment. Chaff launchers are standard, however, active jammers have yet to
become so. This is notably so for Soviet/Russian exports and their indigenously-
produced variants. Likewise, vessels manufactured in the United States for
export are only equipped with the least capable of the U.S. Navy's electronic
warfare (EW) suites. For example, the United States limits EW exports to the
SLQ-32 V(l) variant, which excludes an active jamming capability. Chinese
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exports are evidently an exception; jammers are provided, depending on the
customer nation.2
TABLE 6: CURRENT CORVETTE/LIGHT FRIGATE DESIGNS
Legend/Class Omani Corvette Malaysian BRECA C20 Sa'ar 5
Displacement 1,400 tons 2,270 tons 2,000 tons 1,200 tons
Length (pp) 76.00 m (wl) 97.5 m (wl) 89.70 m (wl) 76.60 m
Length (oa) 83.70 m 106.00 m 97.00 m 85.64 m
Beam 11.50 m 12.75 m 13.90 m 11.88 m
Depth 7.20 m .... m .... m .... m
Draught 3.50 m 3.08 m 3.90 m 3.17 m
Sensors
C2 STACOS NAUTIS ? NTCCS
Fire Control STING &
CASTOR
1802SW 1/3 channels 2xEL/M2221
Radars MW08 DA08 1/2 search 2 search




Guns 76 mm 57 mm up to 100 mm 1 x 76 mm
2 x 20 mm 2 x 30 mm 2 + light 2 x 25 mm
CIWS 1/2.... 2 SEA VULCAN
Missiles
SSM 8 x MM40 Exocet 8 x MM40 Exocet 4/8 x SSM 8 x Harpoon
8 x Gabriel
SAM 8 x Crotale 16 x Seawolf 8/16 x SAM 2 x 32 Barak









Power 4 x 5,570kW 4 x 8,300bhp 2 x 6,000bhp
1 x 30,000shp
Speed 25+ kts 27 kts 30 kts 33 kts
Electric Output 3 x 350kW 3x....kW ?x....kW 2 x 340kW
Bunkers .... tons .... tons .... tons .... tons
Endurance ....run @ ...kts 5,000nm @ 14kts 5,000nm@12kts 3,500nm @ 17kts
Autonomy 21 days
Complement 60 146 90 74
Source: "Frigates", Navy International, April 1990, pp. 144-146.
^ This determination was made after careful review of available open-source literature.
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C MAXIMUM POTENTIAL: ISRAELI SA'AR 5
It is difficult to compare two distinctly different classes of warships, since
the military potential of an individual class of ships depends on the customer
nations unique requirements, and military budget. Additionally, the military
infrastructure to support routine ship operations and the competency levels of
the crew plays a significant role in the ship's overall level of performance.
However, ignoring those factors and comparing the absolute levels of military
capability, in terms of numbers of various types of weapons, it is evident that the
Israeli Navy's Sa'ar 5 class of corvettes is the most heavily armed.
1. Design Requirements
The Sa'ar 5 is manufactured in the United States in collaboration with
the Israeli Navy. Some of the design requirements include: [Ref. 15:p. 212]
• minimum size with a maximum operational capability;
• a high payload to displacement ratio;
• the ability to support helicopter operations, including hanger facilities;
• minimum deck wetness in sea state 4;
• an endurance of 3,000nm at diesel engine cruising speed; and
• provide a maximum speed of 33kts on gas turbine.
Figure 2 illustrates the Sa'ar 5's space allocation compared with that of
a typical warship of 3,000 tons displacement. By limiting the ship's operational
area and requirements for extensive on-board maintenance facilities, more space
has been devoted to warfighting potential. More than one-third of the ship's
volume is allocated to combat systems, compared to a norm of 22%. [Ref. 15:p.
212]
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Source: Maritime Defence, June 1990, p. 212
Figure 2: Space Allocation Differences
Sa'ar 5 vs. Typical Warship
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The hull is sub-divided by 11 transverse watertight bulkheads and six
fire zones. Stealth features have been incorporated throughout, and include:
• resiliently mounted main and auxiliary machinery;
• thermal/acoustic insulation on the interior of hull in machinery spaces;
• installation of a prairie-masker air system;3
• gas turbine and diesel propulsion exhaust eductors;
• diesel-generator exhausts equipped with water-spray injection; and
• radar cross section reduction by form, shielding, and the use of radar
absorbant material (RAM). [Ref. 15:pp. 212-213]
2. Weapons Fit
The defensive/offensive weapon-fit of the Sa'ar 5 is particularly
powerful for a vessel of its size. It carries 64 Barak point-defense missiles in two
32-cell vertical-launch silos, a 76mm dual-purpose automatic gun forward of the
superstructure, and a 5-barrel 25mm Sea Vulcan that is mounted port and
starboard on the bridge deck. Anti-ship weaponry includes two quadruple
launchers for Harpoon and eight single Gabriel IV launcher cells. Triple Mk32
torpedo tubes are carried port and starboard for close anti-submarine
engagements. The ship is capable of embarking a helicopter or unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) which can be used for reconnaisance and targeting. Additionally,
the helicopter can be fitted with air-to-surface missiles or torpedoes.
3. Countermeasures
The Sa'ar 5's installed countermeasures systems include a
comprehensive ESM/ECM outfit, equipped with passive listening and threat
3The Prairie-Masker air system works to reduce the ships radiated acoustic signature by
forcing air bubbles out through tiny holes in bands around the engineering spaces (below the
water line) and out through holes in the ships screw(s).
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evaluation capabilities, and multiple active jammers. So-called "soft kill" systems
include four 72-tube chaff and infrared (IR) flare launchers, two 24-tube smoke
rocket launchers, and a Nixie torpedo decoy system.
4. Electronics
One of the most impressive aspects of the Sa'ar 5 is the amount of
indigenously-built electronic equipment. The ship will include a fully integrated
command and control system, developed in Israel, featuring 17 color tactical
displays with most functions, such as electronic warfare or surface-picture
compilation, available at most consoles, plus facilities for a task-force
commander. [Ref. 16:p. 299] Two main computers (one of which is redundant),
linked by a local area network (LAN), will connect the system.
Israel's IAI (Israel Aircraft Industries) Elta division has developed an
improved, 3-D version of the Automatic Missile Detection Radar for the Sa'ar 5.
This S-band radar is designed to automatically detect incoming sea-skimming
missiles, carry out automatic threat evaluation, and designate them to the ship's
Barak anti-missile fire-control channel. [Ref. 16:p. 300] The Sa'ar 5 will be
equipped with two EL/M-2221-GM STGR (search, track, and guidance radar)
fire-control radars for the Barak missiles. [Ref. 16:p. 300]
It will feature an additional fire-control /surveillance channel in the
form of two multi-sensor stabilized integrated systems (MSIS) from Electro-
Optics Industries, another Israeli company. These systems carry three sensors: a
forward-looking IR (FLIR) operating in the 8-12m band, laser, and a daylight
television camera. [Ref. 7:p. 250] Finally, the communications
intelligence/direction finding (COMINT/DF) system, electronic warfare suite,
and decoy launching systems are all produced in Israel. [Ref. 16:p. 301] The hull-
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mounted sonar and Nixie torpedo-decoy systems are manufactured in the United
States. The Sa'ar 5 will be fitted for both a variable depth and a towed array sonar
systems, however, neither system will be installed initially.
D. CONCLUSION
Small warships were produced in large numbers by the mature navies
during World War II to fulfill a limited role: escorting merchant ships. Their
primary armament included depth charges for use against submarines, and
medium and small-caliber guns for use against surface and air threats. During
and after the war, they proved to be much more versatile, in fact, and though
space and weight were limited, they proved readily adaptable to a wide range of
weapons capabilities and missions. As a result, they became the platform-of-
choice for most of the post-war ex-colonial fleets.
New designs and technological improvements in weapon and sensor
capabilities with reduced weight requirements have allowed small warships to
assume additional roles. By the mid-1960s, rather than continuing to purchase
"second-hand" warships from the mature navies, some developing navies began
to acquire new ships which are tailor-made to their particular circumstances and
needs. In addition to purchasing new warships, some countries have developed
the capability to produce some or all of these ships indigenously. The reasons for
this include: a desire for reduced reliance on other countries; local employment;
an expanded shipbuilding capability; and an export base. Corvette and light
frigate-size vessels have the potential of being heavily armed and technologically
sophisticated and may well serve as the "capital ship" of smaller navies.
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The next chapter will look at some of the ways in which small warships are
able to increase their military capabilities. These will include modular designs
which allow the same ship to perform different missions, "stealth" features which
reduce the detectability, and the sophisticated weapons which are being utilized
on these platforms.
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IV HULLS, WEAPONS, AND SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT
Technological improvements have allowed warship designers to build more
military potential into smaller ships. Ships of corvette/light frigate-size can now
be classified as multi-purpose platforms. The mature navies have traditionally
been the leaders of technological innovations, and the rest of the world has relied
upon them for advanced systems. However, more nations are developing the
economic and industrial capabilities necessary to produce advanced ships and
weapon systems. This chapter explores technological advances in terms of ship
hull designs, weapon systems, and signature management techniques, and how
they are or could be incorporated in corvette /light frigate-size hulls.
A. SHIP HULLS
1. Increases in Size
For the past 30 years, the FAC and FPB have been the preferred choice
of small navies. With anti-ship missiles on a small displacement hull, these
vessels were promoted as the "naval equalizer", cheap and yet under certain
circumstances capable of sinking larger warships. They are the descendents of
the American PT-boats, British MTBs, and German Schnellboote of World War II.
But, like their predecessors they have not influenced the naval balance of power
as greatly as their supporters envisioned.
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A growing understanding of their limitations has caused the
popularity of these small vessels to wane. Larger displacement craft have proven
necessary in order to mount the electronic and defensive systems required for a
vessel to survive against a determined adversary equipped with advanced
weapons and aircraft. The corvette/light frigate is the natural "next step-up" for
many navies. The trend in acquisition of FACs and Corvette/ Light frigate vessels
is shown in Figure 3. It can be seen that the acquisition of new FACs peaked
during the early 1980s and dropped off sharply after 1984. This trend suggests a
realization of the FACs limitations and thus a need for larger, more capable
ships. A counter argument might be that the market for FAC-size vessels was
simply saturated at that point. The final answer probably will not be revealed
until those FACs which are currently in the inventories of the world's navies
have served their useful lives and are in need of replacement.
The establishment of EEZs and the requirement to patrol these ocean
areas provides additional reasons for a maritime nation to acquire larger vessels.
Larger displacement craft, besides having greater endurance, provide additional
internal volume, and offer a more stable platform from which to operate
helicopters. Smaller nations unable to afford separate Navy and Coast Guard
units might be best served by purchasing multi-purpose vessels. These ships
could be designed and configured for an extensive weapons suite, however, it
need not be fitted from the outset. The concept of designing and constructing a
ship for eventual upgrade has a number of advantages, including: lower initial
cost; and guaranteed space and weight requirements being satisfied. Malaysia,
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20-year period with which to patrol her extensive EEZ. [Ref. 17:p. 45] Other
countries, particularly those in the Far East are expected to have similar needs.
2. Modular Equipment Concepts
The concept of warship "modularity" is still fairly new, but has been
tried, to different degrees, by a number of companies. Basically, modularity
involves the ability to change a ship's "mission profile" by rapidly adding or
exchanging major components. For example, by replacing a gun system with a
missile launcher, a vessel tasked for coastal patrol duties one day can
theoretically be made fit to perform a sea denial mission the next. This capability
has been made possible by the creation of standard-size containers and consoles
that are linked to a common computer databus using common computer
language.
Modularity is utilized by the U.S. Navy in the form of its Mk 41
vertical launch system (VLS). These VLS "cells" can be loaded with a variety of
different weapons, including Tomahawk cruise-missiles, vertical launch ASROC
(VLA), and Standard SAMs. As said, the concept is still fairly new in foreign
navies, so the full extent of its merits and drawbacks are unknown. In addition, it
is not known how many countries will be able to afford to purchase "extra"
equipment and allow it to sit idle in a warehouse. There is also the question of
crew proficiency. When a ship undergoes a dramatic shift in roles or capabilities,
will it be necessary to change crews, or can one complement be trained to cope
with a "balanced" spectrum of warfare capabilities and missions?
Two innovators in the concept of modularity are the German company
of Blohm+Voss and the Danish Navy. Blohm+Voss has developed and
successfully exported their MEKO classes of corvettes and frigates to seven
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nations so far. The Danish Navy has incorporated modularity into its new
Standard Flex 300 (STANFLEX 300) class of multi-mission ships. The STANFLEX
300 ships are smaller than corvettes, however, the concepts which they
demonstrate are readily adaptible to larger vessels.
a. Blohm-Voss MEKO Designs
(1) Design Concept. The German shipbuilders Blohm + Voss, in
an effort to control rising warship costs, began to explore the potential of
utilizing containerized weapon and electronic systems, and main and auxiliary
machinery. Initial design studies proved promising and the company decided to
move forward with the concept in 1969. The idea is based on using standard-
sized and interchangeable so-called Functional Units (FES) with standard
interfaces. Where containers are inappropriate — as in the consoles within a
combat information center, for example - standard pallets are used.
(2) Advantages. The MEKO/FES concept not only enables a
standard hull to be used with a wide variety of weapon fits, but also has
advantages during building, maintenance, refit and modernization. These
advantages include:
• time and cost savings as a result of parallel construction and outfitting of
hull and Functional Units;
• non-disturbance of units after factory completion and testing;
• time and cost savings by eliminating duplication of factory setting-up
aboard ship;
• clear division of responsibility between equipment manufacturer and
shipbuilder;
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• rapid removal and replacement of Functional Units without disturbing
other onboard systems;
• refit and repair of Functional Units in clean conditions ashore; and
• replacement of obsolete weapon and electronic systems without the need
for major structural alterations.
(3) Initial Platforms. The concept has so far proved itself in
terms of flexibility and ease of manufacture. The first ship ordered under this
new concept, a MEKO 360 (3,600 tons) for Nigeria took a total of 38 months from
start to completion. This is exceptionally fast for a ship of that size and
complexity. About a year later Argentina ordered four MEKO 360.H2s, capable
of operating two helicopters. The first of these took only 30 months from laying
down to commissioning; the last was completed in 14 months.
(4) Improvements. Improvements to the basic design have been
incorporated as a result of the Falklands experience as well as advances in
computer technology. Damage control improvements include independent
control and monitoring systems (data bus), independent ventilation systems,
independent seawater firefighting systems, and independent power distribution
systems for each of the ships seperate sections. [Ref. 18:p. 22] By this arrangement
the ship is sub-divided into nine (MEKO 200) or 14 (MEKO 360) self-contained
independent seawater fire fighting systems. Improvements in computer
architecture have made it easier to change Functional Units, and interface them
with a Data Information Link (DAIL) system. MEKO's latest Mod 3 version
incorporates extensive stealth design features that reduce the ship's radar and IR
signatures, and hence its detectability and targetability.
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Blohm & Voss has utilized the MEKO concept thus far to
manufacture MEKO 140 corvettes and MEKO 200 and 360 frigates. They have
been purchased, or manufactured under license, by Argentina, Australia, Greece,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, and Turkey.
(5) The Future. Blohm+Voss has developed the MEKO Mod. 4
as the next step in the highly successful MEKO line. It consists of the MEKO 100,
a 1,000 ton class multi-role vessel. The basic platform can be configured with any
one of five different propulsion arrangements without the need of changing the
ship's main structure. Based on the speed requirements of the customer, the
propulsion variant is selected, which will determine the ship's overall length in
turn. The ship's internal layout and weapon and sensor suites are based upon
one of five mission areas: Search and Rescue, Offshore Patrol Vessel, Surveillance
Patrol Vessel, Anti-Air Warfare, or Anti-Submarine Warfare. The customer can
choose any one of these layouts, or customize the vessel for his navy's unique
needs.
b. STANDARD FLEX 300 Designs
(1) Background. During the 1980s, the Danish Navy faced block
obsolescence of three different classes of ships. A total of 22 ships, including six
fast patrol boats, eight Daphne class patrol craft and eight ex-USN minesweepers
required replacement. The solution was to design a common hull which could
utilize interchangeable modules for each mission. The result was the STANFLEX-
300 concept, a 300 ton glass-reinforced plastic (GRP) sandwich hull designed for
rapid exchange of four modules. In 1985, the first seven Standard Flex ships were
ordered. As of early 1992, 13 had been contracted and another three are expected.
[Ref. 19:pp. E50-52]
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(2) Mission Profiles. The various Standard Flex roles include
surveillance, minelaying, combat, MCM, and future ASW. It is reported that less
than 12 hours are needed to change roles completely, including exchanging four
containers, and amending the software. [Ref. 19:p. E51] The container boxes are
positioned one forward and three in line along the after deck. They may be of
three types: closed with equipment on top, such as missile launchers, closed for
storage, or open-sided with a gun on top. Two minerails bedded in the after deck
can take a 60-ton mineload.
Although the basic idea behind the STANFLEX-300 is that
weapons and non-permanent equipment are installed in four containers per ship,
some items are not containerized. The ASW torpedo tubes are, for example,
mounted on pallets ready to be mounted in prepared positions that are provided
with the necessary power and databus connections. Harpoon missiles and Sea
Gnat decoy launchers will be installed in the same way. [Ref. 20:pp. 40-41]
3. Alternative Hull Concepts
There is currently a number of navies and private companies
experimenting with ships which utilize non-monohull displacement concepts.
Most of these designs operate with a reduced wetted area and include: SWATH
(small waterplane area twin hull), SES (surface effect ship), ACV (air cushion
vehicle), and hydrofoils. Some of the countries experimenting with these designs
include the United States, Russia, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Sweden. Most of
these designs have thus far proven to be expensive both in terms of development
and actual operation. The potential future for these designs is uncertain.
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4. Producer Nations
Many of the navies currently purchasing light warships insist that
some or all of the production be undertaken within their own country. This
requirement has a number of purposes: it allows the country to develop or
expand its naval shipbuilding capability, it helps to promote employment, it
makes the purchasing country less dependent on others, and it creates an export
base. A study carried out by the Sales Organization of the British Ministry of
Defence, concluded, in earl) 1982, that there existed a world market for 114
frigates over the next decade, but that only 14 of these would likely be built
outside the procuring country. [Ref. 21:p. 297] Countries such as Argentina,
South Korea, Greece, Turkey, Australia, and India have undertaken co-
production agreements as part of the terms for procurement of new warships.
B. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILES
1. Overview
The SSM has become the primary offensive weapon for most navies.
No one type of SSM is the same, although many of the enabling technologies are
similar. The only common feature is their mission, which is to harm their victim
with a direct hit. All other aspects — such as their size, weight, launching
procedures, guidance principle and flight profiles — are very dissimilar over the
wide range of missiles currently available or in development.
The results of an SSM hit on a surface vessel ~ dramatically displayed
during the 1982 Falklands War and during the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980s --
are a potent reminder of the efficacy of such weapons. One missile hit can
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neutralize a warship even if it is not sunk outright; secondary fire and explosions
can disable a ship for the duration of a conflict.
2. Diffusion of Suppliers
While guided bombs were used against shipping as long ago as World
War II, it was only in 1958 and 1962 respectively that the Soviet Union
introduced Styx — SS-N-2A (active radar homing) and 2B (IR homing) --
generally into their naval weapon inventory. The proliferation of cruise missiles
is of concern but so is the proliferation of the technology and capability for
manufacture of indigenous designs. According to the Jane's Weapons Systems
series there were just five countries in 1970 (USSR, France, Israel, Italy, and
Sweden) producing seven different ship-launched SSMs. 1 By 1980, the number
had risen to eight countries (above five, plus United States, China, and Norway),
producing over one dozen different variants. The number of different types of
SSMs has continued to grow, as has the number of producer nations. Japan,
South Africa, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom have added themselves to the list
of producer nations, and Brazil is known to have a program in development.
[Ref. 22:pp. 157-159] Table 7 lists the SSMs currently being exported and the
countries which reportedly deploy them.
1 Analysis is limited to designs which lend themselves easily to being deployed on warships of
the size under consideration (600-2,500 tons).
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Argentina, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei,
Darussalem, Cameron, Chile, Colombia, Equador,
Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, South Korea, Kuwait,
Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Tunisia, U.A.E., U.K.
Gabriel
Israel




Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan
Harpoon
USA
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Greece,
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain,
Thailand, Turkey, U.K., Venezuela
Otomat
Italy




Greece, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, U.S.
RBS-15
Sweden






Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Finland, Germany, India, Iraq, North Korea, Libya,
Poland, Romania, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, South
Yemen, Yugoslavia
Sources: lournal of Electronic Defense . January 1992, p. 58., International
Countermeasures Handbook . 1991, pp. 26-27.
This diffusion of producer nations has complicated the task of
determining weapons capabilities and countermeasures. Some of the many
questions which must be answered for each potential threat include: What are
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the weapons operating parameters? How many have been produced? Who has
purchased them? Are there any effective defensive techniques? Does the seeker
have a home-on-jam (HOJ) capability? Will installed ESM system be able to
identify the emitter as a threat? Does the country operating the weapon have the
capability to alter the operating parameters?
3. Current Capabilities and Distribution
a. Exocet
Perhaps the best-known Western manufactured SSM, the
Aerospatiale Exocet, sank the British destroyer Sheffield and the container ship
Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands. It has also been used by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq
War, severely damaging the U.S. frigate Stark, and hitting numerous tankers. It is
widely distributed with more than 2,800 missiles of different variants delivered
and in service in 29 countries. [Ref. 22:p. 157] It exists in ship-launched (MM38
and MM40), air-launched (AM39), and submarine-launched (SM39) versions, all
of them fueled by a solid rocket, and all sea skimmers with active-radar homing.
The MM38 and MM40 versions are also deployed from coastal defense batteries.
The original MM38 version, which has been in production since 1972, has been
ordered by 18 navies to arm 185 ships. [Ref. 23:p. 960] The MM40 is a longer-
range version in a more compact canister as compared to the original MM38.
Total weight is 1,150 rather than the 1,750 kg of MM38, and typically 2 MM40s
can be carried for every one MM38. Over 800 AM39 and 500 MM40 missiles were
ordered as of late 1992. [Ref. 23:p. 960]
The Exocet's rocket propulsion translates into a shorter range
than is possible for a turbojet, however, it also allows for lower boost altitudes
and therefore complicates the defender's early detection. The surface-launched
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version is fired from a fixed launcher (elevated to 12 deg), and the two-second
boost brings the missile to a maximum altitude of 30-70 m [98-229 ft]. The
missile's cruise altitude depends upon distance from the target and sea state, and
can be as low as 2.5 m [8.2 ft]. [Ref. 7:p. 173] Table 8 lists the characteristics of the
different versions of Exocet. Currently, Aerospatiale is producing the MM40
Block 2 for French service, which offers improved seeker performance and allows
ripple firing for saturation attack. [Ref. 23:p. 960] The MM40 was recently chosen
by Malaysia, Oman, and Qatar to equip their corvette fleets with two quad-four
Exocet launchers per vessel. [Ref. 23:p. 960]
TABLE 8: EXOCET CHARACTERISTICS
Versions
MM38 AM39 SM39 MM40

























Warhead 165 kg [364 lb] all versions









Source: Friedman, N., Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems.
1991/92. 1991, p. 173.
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b. Harpoon
The only Western missile to rival the Exocet in terms of numbers
produced and operational flexibility is the American Harpoon, produced by
McDonnell Douglas. Harpoon was conceived in 1965 by the Naval Air Systems
Command as a longer range (25 run) follow-on to the Bullpup missile, and the
program began formally in 1968, following the 1967 Eilat sinking. [Ref. 7:p. 187]
Harpoon was envisioned as a AGM-84 air-launched weapon with a range of
almost 60 miles, but a ship-launched RGM-84 version was added in 1970, while
an encapsulated UGM-84 version for submarine launch began production in
1972. [Ref. 6:p. 45] General production started in 1976, and Harpoon has been a
great technical and commercial success in the American and export markets
since. More than 6,000 have been produced and deployed by the United States
and 20 international customers, including nine NATO navies. It is an all-weather
missile that employs an active radar seeker. [Ref. 23:p. 960] The Harpoon's basic
range-and-bearing mode of operation is identical to that of the Exocet, with
cruise course and height controlled by an inertial navigation system and radar
altimeter, respectively, and the radar seeker activated only at the last moment to
provide accurate homing without giving the target much opportunity to take
counter-measures. Improvements have been developed which incorporate
increased range, way-point flight profiles, and selectable terminal maneuvers.
The use of way-points helps to prevent the target ship from knowing the
direction of the attacker, and allows multiple missiles fired from the same
platform to attack the same target from different directions.
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c. Other Anti-sh ip Miss iles
Although Stvx, Exocet, and Harpoon are the most widely
distributed anti-ship missiles, they are by no means the only ones. Otomat,
Gabriel, and Penguin also enjoy wide distribution, as do China's Hai Ying series
of missiles. The Norwegian Penguin, which differs from its contemparies in that
it uses of a passive IR seeker for terminal homing and is therefore not detectable
by ESM, is in service with the navies of Greece, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and
the United States. [Ref. 24: p. 27]
4. Supersonic SSMs
Supersonic SSMs have been long favored in the Soviet Union and
China, but have only received limited interest in the West so far. Advantages of a
supersonic SSM include: reduced flight time, thus avoiding the need for target
position updates, and reduced target reaction time. The principle disadvantage
of current supersonic SSMs is their need to fly at higher altitude than Western
"sea-skimmers", which increases the defenders chance of detection.
a. TheANS
The West's only supersonic next-generation SSM is the Franco-
German ANS (Anti-Navire Supersonique). In 1987 it had all but completed its
development stage but has since been frozen. Germany's Ministry of Defense
(MoD) has expressed its intention to pull out of the program because of budget
constraints, [Ref. 23:p. 960] but has appropriated funding to finish development.
[Ref. 22:p. 156] It has been reported that France is also delaying the program, due
to severe financial constraints and the more pressing needs of other programs.
[Ref. 23:p. 960]
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If ANS performs as its makers claim, it will be powered by a
rocket/ramjet combination with Mach 2 to 2.3 speed, a range of 100km in a lo-lo-
lo flight profile, and 200-250km in a lo-hi-lo or a hi-hi-lo attack, and will be
capable of 15G maneuvers. [Ref. 23:p. 960] This high speed, coupled with the
ability to perform such high terminal maneuvers (weaving), will cause problems
for many of the currently fielded shipboard defensive systems.
b. Chinese Programs
China reportedly has two different supersonic SSMs under
development, the C-101 and HY-3 (C-301) missiles. Neither system is expected to
enter service before 1995. Both weapons have been offered for export, but there
have been no public reports of foreign orders. [Ref. 25:pp. 512-513] Table 9
provides pertinent estimated data.
TABLE 9: CHINESE SUPERSONIC SSMs UNDER DEVELOPMENT
C-101 HY-3 (C-301)
Diameter 54 cm 76 cm
Length 650 cm (ship launched)
750 cm (air launched)
946 cm (missile only)
985 cm (overall length)
Weight 1850 kg (ship launched)
1500 kg (air launched)
3400 kg
Warhead 300 kg 513 kg
Speed Mach 2.0 (680 m/sec) Mach 2.0 (680 m/sec)
Range 45 km 130 km
Source: Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1992, pp. 512-13.
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5. Missile Associated Radars
In any examination of a potential threat scenario, it is customary to
consider "threats" as including not only the weapons themselves but also the fire-
control radars whose emissions can provide advanced warning of an attack.
However, in considering the potential threat from systems of Western origin it is
necessary to take into account the fact that many Western SSMs are designed to
work with a variety of different types of radar and are in many cases largely
autonomous in operation, needing only an initial input of target position before
going off on their own. This input can be generated by something as simple as a
commercial marine radar that ESM may find indistinguishable from other radars
aboard merchant ships in the vicinity. This is especially true when operating
within a countries littoral region where commercial shipping traffic can be
expected to be dense.
C SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS
Air-flight weapons, whether launched from aircraft (air-to-surface missiles
or anti-ship missiles), from other warships or shore batteries (SSMs) or from
submarines (SLMs) are a great threat to surface craft. A credible air defense can
be provided by shore-based aircraft if a warship limits its operations to coastal
waters, but for operations at any distance from the coast, warships must be
provided with means of self-defense. More than 800 surface ships world wide are
currently armed with SSMs, and hundreds more are deployed on submarines
and fixed and rotary aircraft. The Falklands and Gulf Wars demonstrated the
practical difficulty of defending against such weapons. Future SSMs are
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expected to fly at Mach 2+, maneuver laterally at 15Gs, and carry heavily
armored warheads. Theoretical studies show that installing a 35mm thick armor
plate in front of the warhead in an Exocet-size missile increases the weapons
weight by only 30kg, yet is sufficient to defeat 20mm ammunition fired by a
close-in weapons system. [Ref. 26:p. 1301]
At the heart of any anti-missile system must be an ability to locate the target
at maximum range. The system must then calculate a fire control solution to put
sufficient explosive force close enough to the incoming missile to destroy it
completely, or damage it sufficiently to prevent it from damaging its target — a so
called "mission kill". SAMs are generally categorized according to their range and
thus their capability to defend a given area. Area defense missiles provide an
ability to protect not only the firing unit but ships in company as well. The U.S.
Navy's SM-2 series of SAMs is the best known of the West's area defense
missiles. Point defense missiles because of their limited size and range are
typically used for defending the firing unit only, although they might be able to
provide limited coverage for another unit in close proximity.
1. Area Defense Missile Systems
The size of the warships under consideration (600-2,500 tons) limits
their ability to carry the heavier, long-range air defense SAMs. Current
generations of long range SAMs are usually reserved for warships of 4,000 tons
or larger.
2. Point Defense Missile Systems
One of the primary shortcomings of FAC-size vessels (and many
current corvette/light frigate sized vessels) is their inability to adequately defend
themselves against anti-ship missiles and aircraft equipped with stand-off
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weapons. This was demonstrated in 1986 when U.S. Navy A-6E Intruder aircraft
hit and crippled a Libyan "Combattante II" FAC with Rockeye laser guided
bombs and a Harpoon AGM-84A missile, from a range of seven miles. [Ref. 27:p.
60] In two more engagements the cruiser Yorktown (CG-48) hit another FAC with
two Harpoon RGM-84A missiles, and a group of A-6Es crippled a Soviet-built
Nanuchka type missile corvette with a Harpoon AGM-84A. [Ref. 27:p. 60]
Point-defense SAM systems allow engagement of air threats at ranges
considerable greater than do most gun systems. This provides an added degree
of depth to a ship's defenses. The addition of SAMs to a warship does not
automatically guarantee success against SSMs however, as was proven by the
USS Stark, equipped with Standard SAMs, and the Libyan Nanuchka, equipped
with SA-N-4 SAMs. Table 10 lists the specifics of the various SAM missiles
currently in production and utilized by corvette /light frigate sized vessels.
The number of countries manufacturing these weapons continues to
grow as does their level of sophistication. Many of the systems currently under
production are improvements of systems originally developed in the United
States. For example, the Italian Aspide missile is an improved version of the
American Sea Sparrow missile. It is widely deployed and can be configured in a
lightweight quadruple launcher on warships as small as 300 tons. [Ref. 7:p. 388]
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TABLE 10: PRINCIPAL POINT DEFENSE MISSILES
Dimensions Weight Warhead Speed Range
Brazil
SSA-N-1
















M3 10 km -low
8 km - alt
France
Crotale Naval





















































M1 + 5,000 m
Russia
SA-N-4




M2 + 1.6-13 km
Britain
Sea Cat








M2 approx 5 km
United States
RAM
5x111 in. 1621b 51b. M2 + 5 nm.
Note: * indicates that the system is still in development
Source: Friedman, N., The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons
Systems 1991/92. 1991, pp. 378-411.
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D. NAVAL GUNS
Despite the advent of sophisticated missiles for use against surface and air
targets, the naval gun has remained a standard air defense weapon. Guns can be
used against air and surface targets, as well as targets ashore. Additionally, the
need to counter SSMs that "leak-through" a missile defense screen has prompted
the development of weapons such as Phalanx and Goalkeeper, and has helped to
advance the designs of ordnance and fire control systems. Advances in design
have made possible weapons with much higher rates of fire, and ammunition
with increased lethality over what was available during World War n.
1. Medium Caliber Guns
There are relatively few producers of naval guns in the medium-
caliber (35-mm and up) range. They include: France's 100-mm mounts; Italy's
OTO-Melara 127-mm and 76-mm mounts; Sweden's Bofors mounts in 120-mm,
76-mm, 57-mm, and 40-mm; Russia's 130-mm, 100-mm, 76.2-mm, and 57-mm
mounts, Britain's 4.5-in. mounts, and the United State's 5-in. mountings. Surface
warships of 2,500 tons displacement and below are realistically limited to guns of
five-inch (127 mm.) and below because of the stresses that are imparted to the
ship during firing. The vast majority of light frigate and corvette-size vessels
carries the three inch (76 mm.) dual purpose gun, as their principal gun
armament. Guns of 57-mm and 40-mm are also very popular on smaller craft as
either a main or secondary battery.
a. Five Inch Guns
The Italian Lupo class frigates (2,500 tons full load displacement)
of the Italian, Peruvian, and Venezuelian navies are the only recent examples of
vessels of light frigate-size or smaller with five-inch guns. All carry the OTO
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Melara 5 in (127 mm)/54 gun which is capable of firing 45 rounds a minute out
to 16 kilometers (8.7 nm), against surface targets. [Ref. 28:pp. 316, 456, 811] These
guns are lighter and have a higher rate of fire than their U.S. counterparts.
b. Three Inch Guns
Three inch (76 mm.) naval guns are widely distributed and are
capable of being used against surface vessels, aircraft, and anti-ship missiles. The
Russian Navy produces a number of variations of a 76.2 mm/ 60 gun design.
This weapon can be found on most smaller Russian frigates, corvettes, and
missile hydrofoils, has a rate of fire of 120 rounds/minute, and a maximum
range of 14,000 meters against surface targets. [Ref. 7:p. 447] The Italian OTO-
Malera 76 mm/62 is one of the most successful recent medium-caliber weapons,
and is widely exported. It is licensed for manufacture in Japan, Spain, and the
United States (as the Mk 75). The 'Compact' version of the 76 mm/62 fires at a
rate of 85 rounds/minute, which can be increased to 100 rounds/minute with the
addition of a retrofit kit. [Ref. 7:pp. 430-431] The latest version, "Super Rapid"
was designed specifically for SSM defense. It has a selectable rate of fire of one,
10, or 120 rounds/minute. [Ref. 7:p. 431] In addition to the new mounting, OTO-
Melara has developed a new prefragmented round filled with tungsten cubes.
This shifts more of the mass toward the outer body as it spins, making for a
greater moment of inertia about the projectile's axis and thus for better stability
in flight. [Ref. 7:p. 431] The Italian Navy believes that a single "Super Rapid"
mount controlled by a Dardo fire control system should be able to engage four
subsonic sea-skimming SSMs, approaching on courses 90 degrees apart, before
any approaches within 1,000 meters of the target ship. [Ref. 7:p. 431]
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c. Other Sizes
Naval guns in sizes other than three and five inches are available
and continue to be manufactured and upgraded. These weapons may serve as
either the main or as a secondary battery on smaller ships. France, Italy, Sweden,
Switzerland, and Russia are the primary producers.
2. Point Defense Gun Systems
Point defense gun systems are designed specifically to deal with SSMs,
and are commonly termed close-in weapons systems (CIWS). They rely on either
a very high rate of fire of inert projectiles to destroy or fuze an incoming SSM
(e.g., U.S. Phalanx), or on larger caliber rounds which utilize proximity or time-
delay fused ordnance to destroy the incoming threat. Typical calibers of CIWS
systems range from 20-mm to 76-mm.
a. 20-mm to 30-mm Systems
Systems within the 20-mm to 30-mm CIWS range include the
U.S. Phalanx, French SAMOS, Italian Myriad, Netherlands Goalkeeper, Spanish
Meroka, Swiss Sea Zenith, and Russian 30-mm and twin 30-mm mounts. With
the exception of Spain's Meroka and Switzerland's Sea Zenith systems all the
CIWS systems within this group utilize either a single or dual "gatling" guns. The
French SAMOS system is the only one of the group which does not have an
associated fire-control radar system. Instead, it relies entirely on electro-optical
tracking by a Volcan fire-control system. [Ref. 7:p. 428] Details of specific
capabilites are provided in Table 11.
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TABLE 11: CLOSE-IN-WEAPON SYSTEMS (20-MM TO 30-MM)
System Caliber Rate of Muzzle #of Effective Ammunition
Country Fire Velocity Barrels Range Capacity
SAMOS 30-mm 1x7
France gatling
Myriad 25-mm 10,000 1270 m/s 2x7 l,000m+ 2,000 rnds
Italy rnds/min. gatling
Goalkeeper 30-mm 4,200 3,300 1x7 2,000m 1,200 rnds
Netherlands rnds/min. ft/ sec gatling
Meroka 20-mm 9,000 1,300 m/s 1x12 1,500m 720 rnds
Spain rnds/min. single
Sea Zenith 25-mm 850 1,335 m/s 1x4 415 rnds/gun
Switzerland rnds/min. single (1,660 rnds)




Phalanx 20-mm 1,000-4,500 3,650 1x6 1,625 989 rnds
U.S. rnds/min. ft/ sec. gatling yards
Source: Friedman, N., Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems
1991/92. 1991, pp. 426-474.
b. Heavier than 30-mm Systems
Close-in weapon systems with calibers greater than 30-mm
consist of either a single or dual barrel mountings. These weapons very often are
designed to engage surface and air targets as well as SSMs, and may also be
utilized for shore bombardment. The Italian firms of Breda and OTO-Melara and
the Swedish firm Bofors produce the majority of the guns in this category.
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The primary benefit of using weapons of this size against anti-
ship missiles is their greater range. However, the range benefit can be negated by
missiles performing large oscillations in either the horizontal or vertical plane,
since the weapons aim point is based on a predicted position. A number of
companies are currently working on course-corrected ammunition which would
help to defeat maneuvering targets.
3. Overall
The majority of naval gun systems capable of operating from light
frigate-size vessels and smaller is produced in a limited number of countries.
Italy and Sweden control a large percentage of the market with their OTO-
Melara, Breda, and Bofors weapons, while France, Switzerland, Netherlands,
Russia, and the United States also contribute. Advances continue to be made in
the areas of weapon rates-of-fire, dispersion, and ammunition lethality.
Improvements in lethality due to technological innovations such as the proposed
AHEAD (advanced hit efficiency and destruction) ammunition, under
development by Oerlikon-Contraves, and course-corrected ammunition, should
it prove feasible, would provide an alternative to point-defense missile systems
for engaging maneuvering targets (SSMs).
E. SIGNATURE MANAGEMENT
Increasing attention is being given to reducing a ship's characteristic
signatures. These include electronic emissions, radiated noise levels, IR
emissions, and radar reflectivity. These signatures can be used by an enemy to
detect, track, and initiate an attack against a ship. The open press has variously
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referred to attempts to manage detectable signatures as CCD (camouflage,
concealment & deception), 'observable countermeasures', 'signature
management', and 'stealth' . So-called 'stealth' technology has been used
throughout history. The Trojan horse was a form of 'stealth' and so are
smokescreens, camouflage paint and many other physical and electronic
methods of avoiding detection or confusing enemy intelligence by denying him
information on the size, intentions and capability of friendly forces.
Reducing the ship's various emission signatures that are exploited by SSMs
will reduce the ship's detectability, therefore increasing the effectiveness of ECM
and making the ship more survivable in combat. Stealth applications in terms of
acoustic quieting reduce the radiated noise level that the ship transmits into the
water, which makes them better ASW platforms.
The navies of the major industrial powers have incorporated various
degrees of stealth into warship designs over the years. Efforts have ranged from
simple applications of broad-band radar absorbing materials (RAM) all the way
to exotic multi-million dollar floating stealth-technology testbeds. The U.S. Navy
recently revealed photographs and specifications for Sea Shadow, a "black
program" which had been conducted, starting in the mid-1980s, to test various
stealth methods as applied to warships. The Arleigh Burke destroyers have
benefited from this research and utilize hull shaping, acoustic quieting, IR
suppression, and RAM coatings as methods of signature management. The
British Navy applied inexpensive broadband netting to its surface fleet during
the Falkland's War. [Ref. 29:p. 986] The French Navy's newest La Fayette class
frigate is advertised to incorporate a number of stealth measures, including hull
shaping and the application of RAM to reduce radar cross-section. The Danish
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Navy has incorporated a number of stealth characteristics into both the
STANFLEX-300 and larger Thetis class patrol vessels. The Swedish Navy is
conducting experiments with Smydge, a SES prototype which incorporates
extensive stealth technology.
1. Radar Reflectivity Management
In the same way that materials can be made transparent, opaque or
reflective to light, so they can be to radar. In order for a naval target to reflect
radar, the target or features of the target must be the same size or larger than the
illuminating wavelength of the radar waves.
The amount of radar energy reflected by a target is influenced by the
size of the target, but also by its angular orientation, the absorption coefficient of
the materials from which it is constructed and by the frequency of the
illuminating radar. Radar cross section (RCS) is also influenced by the pulse
width of pulsed radars. This effort to reduce the ship's RCS is aimed primarily at
improving survivability against radar homing, anti-ship cruise missiles. The
primary methods of reducing a vessels RCS is through hull shaping and/or the
application of RAM.
a. Hull Shaping
Probably the easiest and most widely employed method to
reduce a ships RCS is through hull shaping. Shaping is a simple concept in which
designers orient reflective surfaces in such a way that instead of reflecting
incident radar energy back they reflect it away from the illuminating source.
Figure 4 shows the reductions in RCS which are possible by altering the shape of
a ships hull. Corner reflectors and rectangular cavities return incident energy












































































curved surfaces return very little energy to the source except at normal incidence.
The presence of corners and cavities on a naval vessel are the most significant
features in producing a radar signature which can be detected from a wide range
of surveillance locations. Large flat surfaces are only significant when observed
from points which are at 90° to those surfaces. The main technique employed is
to shape the superstructure to concentrate the echoes away from the enemy in
one of a number of predetermined directions. This has lead to a superstructure
that remains "box-like" but with sloping sides. Additionally, strong corner
reflectors (orthogonal structures or di-hedrals and tri-hedrals) can be opened up
by a few degrees and "detuned".
b. RAM Materials
In a radar absorbing material, radar waves enter the material
with little reflection at the surface. The materials within the RAM are "electrically
lossy" and absorb microwaves; minimal reflection takes place. Essentially, RAM
converts micro-wave energy into heat via loss mechanisms which include
resistance, di-electric and magnetic losses. Radar absorbers are usually either
narrow band (resonant) and absorb at specific frequencies, or broadband and
absorb over a wide frequency range. RAM coatings generally are produced in
rigid sheet form or as coatings or spray-on materials.
Early, first-generation RAMs were mostly narrowband, resonant,
quarterwave, threat-specific materials. These were tailored to counter the threat
of Exocet missiles. [Ref. 29:p. 988] Subsequently, in second and third generation




The chief sources of noise and vibration on a large naval vessel are
usually associated with the operation of engines and auxiliary machinery and
with the noise generated by rotating propellers. Machinery of different types will
radiate sound at distinct frequencies (or tonals). Thus, there are specific tonals
associated with gearing caused by the meshing of gear teeth; there are tonals
associated with the blades of turbines; and there are a wide variety of tonals
caused by the design of an electric motor.
Many of the methods to reduce the amount of transmitted noise from
a surface ship have been learned from the operation and experiences of
submarines. These include: single and double rafts on which equipment is
mounted in order to isolate it from the hull; flexible joints on piping runs;
acoustic enclosures; application of sound deadening insulation on the inside
surface of the hull; and the application of anechoic tiles to the exterior of the ship.
Active measures can include air-fed systems such as 'Prairie Masker', which
operates by bubbling a thin film of air on the exterior of a ships hull, and around
the propellers, in order to reduce acoustic detection ranges.
3. IR Management
As is the case with radar cross-section, prediction of IR signatures
relative to background IR levels is of great importance. The radiation incident
upon an object, its absorbability and reflectivity, and its thermal conductivity and
heat capacity will all influence the surface temperature of an object. So too will
ambient conditions, such as rain and other precipitation, and the effect of
conduction by sea wash and air flow when the ship is underway.
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The principal objective of IR signature control is to address the middle
IR (MIR) between 3mm and 6mm; and the far IR (FIR) between 6mm and 15mm
regions. Two well-known "windows" occur where transmission of IR energy is
greatest. These are centered on 4mm and 10mm. [Ref. 29:p. 992] The MIR region
is significant because these are the frequencies used by missiles equipped with IR
seekers, while the FIR region is utilized by IR surveillance devices.
The main producer of IR radiation is the engine exhaust and the area
in the immediate vicinity of the engine uptakes. One obvious way of eliminating
an above-water engine exhaust signature is to have the diesels and auxiliaries
vent underwater. Diesel engines can withstand the high backpressure involved,
but it is still necessary to have them vent above water on starting. In the case of
gas turbine powered ships, the metal surfaces of the exhaust can be cooled and
the hot exhaust exhaust plume can be cooled by diluting it with cool air drawn
into the upper part of the engine uptakes.
4. Swedish Smyge
The Swedish Navy is conducting tests on a grp-foam (glass reinforced
plastic) sandwich twin-hull SES technology demonstrator named Smyge.
Smyge's main purposes are:
• to provide experience of stealth technology in order to give future
combat vessels a high life expectancy due to them being difficult to see visually,
with radar, IR, magnetic or hydro-acoustic sensors at affordable cost;
• to serve as a test platform for new weapons systems, sensors,
communications and navigation equipment, individually and with other systems
in field conditions; and
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• to provide experience of SES technology and the suitability of the
configuration for seakeeping and as a weapons platform, and operational
characteristics in heavy weather and ice conditions. [Ref. 30:p. 243]
The 30 meter, 140 ton demonstrator is capable of speeds of 50 knots,
and carries a crew of 14 (6 officers, 8 ratings). [Ref. 30:p. 243] All normally
exposed weapons and equipments have been made retractable where possible
and covered with flush hatches, and merged into the form as far as possible
when they cannot be concealed. Waterjet propulsion has been selected because of
its lower noise levels at higher speeds. The weapon-fit comprises a Bofors 40-mm
dual-purpose Trinity gun, contained in a low radar cross section (RCS) cupola,
two RBS.15 anti-ship missiles on retractable launch ramps, and 400-mm wire-
guided/homing A/S torpedoes launched through a hatched port in the stern.
[Ref. 30:p. 243] A dipping sonar or light towed array sonar can be raised and
lowered from the "moonpool", located at the center of gravity of the vessel for
easy handling.
F. CONCLUSION
Modularity of design and the concept of building ships with the space and
weight for later additions of weapons provides great benefits, particularly for
navies who expect to operate relatively close to home. Ships configured to
perform EEZ patrols primarily, can, during periods of regional tension, re-
configure to perform naval missions. This provides poorer maritime nations with
a flexible naval platform.
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The technologically developed countries of the world, primarily Western
Europe and the United States, continue to be the major suppliers of advanced
weapons systems. These countries have the research and development (R&D)
capability and the technological base necessary to produce the most advanced
weapons. The widespread distribution of these weapons and the technology
which makes them work, principally anti-ship missiles, has resulted in a number
of indigenous programs.
Reductions in characteristic signatures of ships are expected to continue as
more shipbuilders take advantage of lessons learned from the industrialized
world. This is especially true in the area of hull shaping, which is basically a no
cost benefit to ship design. Future ships can be expected to be more difficult to
detect, and the armament which they carry will be less certain.
The next chapter will examine the various electronic and computer-based
command and control systems which are available for installation into smaller
ships. As technology progresses and computational capability becomes more
compact, the military capabilities of smaller ships improves. Ship hulls are
expected to remain functional for approximately 30 years, however, electronic
systems are considered obsolete with ten years or less.
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V. ELECTRONIC AND COMMAND DECISION SYSTEMS
A. ELECTRONICS
While it may be possible to compromise on displacement and length,
machinery and armament, there is one area where there is no room for
compromise in a warship's design — and that is the area of electronics. The heart
of any modern warship is its electronic equipment, for virtually every aspect of a
warship's design demands some connection with electronics. Any major
advances in warship capabilities in all likelihood will be centered around
electronics. This could include new or improved methods to integrate and
display data, faster computer processing capability, better detection or counter-
detection capabilities, or better target discrimination.
The main area for concern relates to the surveillance and detection of all
friendly, hostile and neutral targets, the integration of all relevant data gathered
concerning those targets, and the control and direction of weapons used to
defend the ship or attack hostile forces. The electronics systems integrated with
the weapons make up the ship's combat system.
B. ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS
1. Defining Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) and the equipment which supports it is highly
specialized. "The exploitation of the enemy's use of electronics, and the taking of
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measures to counter his use of such techniques, is known as Electronic Warfare,
or EW." [Ref. 31:p. 34] In doing so, EW can frequently be of greater tactical value
than radar which, generally, only pinpoints the location of a contact (target)
without having the ability to identify it. On the other hand a complete EW suite,
which includes ECM and ESM, has the ability to intercept, characterize, and
execute deception procedures against hostile radars and missile seekers.
2. Producers and Consumers
Many countries are acquiring modern weapons and electronics that
are easy to transport, operationally simple and effective against expensive,
sophisticated U.S. weapons and platforms. As a result, U.S. aircraft and ships are
vulnerable in many parts of the world where they long have been immune to
advanced weapons and EW threats. Table 12 lists the countries which are
primary producers of EW equipment and those third-world countries which are
recipients. This table lists all EW equipment transfers not just naval systems. In
addition to these primary suppliers, a number of countries have recently begun
producing EW equipment for export. These include Australia, Chile, Denmark,
Norway, South Africa, and Spain. Further down the road looms the spectre of
nations such as Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Japan, Singapore and
Taiwan getting into the game. All already have or are capable of developing an
indigenous EW base and all have the potential of becoming exporters. [Ref.
32:pp. 42-47]
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TABLE 12: THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WITH EW CAPABILITY
Country Manufacturing Equipment
U.S. Russia France Italy Israel U.K.
Algeria X
Argentina X X X
Bahrain X





Egypt X X X
























U.A.E. X X X X
Venezuela X X
Source: Journal of Electronic Defense, November 1992, pp. 42-47
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3. Chaff and Decoy Launchers.
Chaff and decoy launchers are the portion of an EW system which
launch various off-board countermeasures, flares, and decoys. Decoy launchers
are considered essential as an extremely cost-effective means of self protection.
For a start, since they operate from locations away from the ship itself, their use
offers a minimum-risk solution to the anti-ship missile problem. The greatest
protection is provided by integrated EW systems which automatically deploy
expendables (chaff and flares) and calculate and recommend ship courses to
steer. Israel utilized a combination of chaff and tactics during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli conflict to neutralize Arab Styx missiles. Over 50 Styx missiles were fired,
with not one hit. [Ref. 33:p. 325]
Ships typically deploy chaff (and IR decoys) by launching them from
fixed or trainable launchers, using rockets or mortars. Rockets provide longer
range (for the dilution role) and do not impose any load on the surrounding
deck. This is important since deck flex, in the case of an aluminum
superstructure, can result in the round either not reaching its full range or not
firing. Rockets however, are relatively large, and a designer must protect against
backblast. Both types exist in considerable variety and are widely available.
Major manufacturers of launchers and expendables include France, Germany,
Israel, Italy, Sweden, Taiwan, Russia, Britain, and the U.S. [Ref. 7:pp. 475-546]
a. Chaff Techniques
Chaff launched from a ship can have one or more of three distinct
functions. Firing at long range, the chaff can provide a targeting radar or an
incoming missile with multiple spurious targets. If all targets must be engaged,
the attack is diluted, and close-in weapons have a better chance of dealing with
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those weapons which do lock onto the ship itself. The second, intermediate-range
function is to seduce the missile seeker away from the ship target onto a decoy
cloud. Finally, there is a last-ditch tactic, centroid seduction. The missile's seeker
generally homes on the centroid of the target's return, seeing the ship target as a
complex array of point and corner reflectors. If a large chaff cloud is added, it
moves the centroid up and away from the ship target, and the missile may pass
overhead or to the side. Sophisticated SSMs however, will incorporate one or
more counter-countermeasures to help it distinguish the target ship from the
chaff cloud.
b. Other Decoys
In addition to being able to fire radar reflecting chaff, decoy
launchers also fire flares designed to decoy SSMs equipped with IR seekers.
These flares may be fired separately from or as part of a chaff cloud. The latest
addition to the off board countermeasure arsenal is the addition of sophisticated
active decoys. These decoys would either be fired from a chaff launcher of
deployed from the ship to float on the water of hover in the vicinity. The
advantage of these types of active devices is their ability to transmit electronic
signals in hopes of decoying even the most sophisticated missile seekers.
4. Electronic Counter-Measure Devices
ECM devices fall into two broad categories, intercept receivers (often
termed ESM, electronic support measures) and active counter-measures
(jammers and more sophisticated deception devices). ESM includes not only
attack warning but also passive detection of air and surface forces beyond the
sensor's horizon. The success of defensive EW activities depends very much on
the defender's ability to detect and recognize the presence of a threat in a timely
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fashion, and on his ability to counter the threat with whatever means he has
available, whether by jammers, chaff or other forms of off-board decoy.
Compared to their Soviet counterparts, many Western naval radars
can be significantly more difficult to detect and identify on ESM because they
operate in crowded frequency bands and radiate at low peak power levels. In
some cases their emissions may be indisquingishable from commercial radar
signals. Because of the widespread use of monopulse tracking techniques,
Western fire-control radars and missile seekers are also more difficult targets for
ECM than their more conservative Soviet equivalents. 1
All corvette/light frigate vessels currently being purchased are
equipped with some sort of ESM equipment, however, not all are equipped with
active jammers. The vessels supplied from the former Soviet Union, and now
Russia, are by far the most obviously lacking in active jamming capabilities. The
Chinese supply some of their customers with jamming equipment and not
others. This may be due to the customer not wishing or being able to afford the
equipment, as much as it could be a policy on the part of the Chinese
government.2
^For a more detailed description of Soviet and Western design practices, including operational
frequency bands see, Ian Hall, "Western Weapons Systems, Countering the Home Grown Threat",
The International Countermeasures Handbook, 16th Edition, 1991.
2This determination was made after careful review of current open-source literature.
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C RADAR SYSTEMS
A comprehensive examination of radar fundamentals is beyond the scope
of this paper, however, a brief overview of basic principles, current systems, and
advanced technologies is included.
1. Radar Basics
Radar systems, although varied, are all designed to perform a similar
function: to transmit and receive electro-magnetic energy in order to detect the
presence of objects. Radar's primary uses on ship are for surveillance of the sea
and air zones around the ship and acquisition and tracking of targets of interest.
Surveillance covers a wide variety of functions, from detecting high-speed SSMs,
to detecting the ships those missiles are intended to hit. After detecting the
presence of a contact it is necessary to obtain periodic updates in order to
calculate the contact's bearing, range, course, speed, and altitude (airborne
contacts). These periodic updates, fused with information from other sensors or
platforms, permits a ship to develop a "track" on a contact.
Surveillance radars are generally categorized as being either two
dimensional (2-D) or three dimensional (3-D). Two dimensional radars provide
only a range and bearing to a contact, while 3-D radars also provide an angular
component (from horizontal) which is converted to altitude. Most current radars
utilize a rotating antenna and are therefore able to obtain updates only as often
as the antenna scans past the contact. Typical long-range air-search radars scan at
six to 12 rotations per minute, surface-search radars at 12 to 24 rotations per
minute, and fire-control radars at 40 to 60 rotations per minute. Phased array
radars on the other hand, such as the U.S. Navy's AEGIS (SPY-1) radar, are able
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to electronically steer their radar energy, which enables contact updates several
times per second, if necessary. [Ref. 7:p. 337]
The number of companies manufacturing naval radar systems is
limited. Companies such as Marconi, Thompson-CSF, Philips, Elta, Gem
Elettronica, BEAB (formally PEAB), Ercisson, Contraves, Plessey, and Raytheon
produce most of the current naval radars.
2. LPI Technology
Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) systems are most commonly
discussed in connection with proposed "stealthy" aircraft and ships. Their
attraction is that they achieve constant radar coverage without giving away the
presence of the platform whence they radiate. LPI performance can be achieved
in two complementary ways. One is to spread the radar signal over so broad a
spectrum of frequencies that it is mistaken for random noise; the signal could be
detected (e.g., by the receiver) only if the random combination were decoded.
The other is to break up the characteristic radar scan into a pseudo-random
hopping from one beam position to another. This entails electronic scanning, and
any fixed phased-array radar, like SPY-1, should be programmable for such
scanning.
a. Uses for "Quiet" Radars
LPI, or "quiet", radars are advertised as being useful for the
following:
• wherever navigation or detection of surface vessels is desired without
emitting high peak power pulses;
• coastal monitoring;
• ideally suited to prevent the detection of a submarine by ESM; and
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• allows vessel movements to be monitored, without being detected by
radar receivers, to aid policing actions.
b. Operational Systems
The application of LPI radar technology is still new, however a
number of companies have fielded operational systems. The two systems which
currently show the most promise are PILOT and SCOUT. Both operate on the
same principle of frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) transmission,
and each utilizes 1 watt (1W) or less average power.
(1) PILOT Covert Naval Radar. PILOT is a naval LPI radar that
uses FMCW technology. PILOT is a joint venture of Signaal, Philips Electronics of
Sweden, and the Philips Research Laboratories in the United Kingdom. The
feasibility of FMCW technology was demonstrated in the spring of 1986, and
PILOT was announced in April 1988. The system has undergone extensive
testing, both at sea and in the laboratory. In one case a PILOT-equipped ship was
able to turn on her radar during a radar-silence exercise without being detected
by ships operating in company with her. [Ref. 7:p. 279] The FMCW transmissions
of the PILOT radar have an average power of 1 Watt, compared to the lOkW
peak and 10W average power levels for a conventional pulsed radar. [Ref. 34:p.
1177] PILOT has an ESM counter-detection range of approximately 1.3 nautical
miles since ESM receivers are triggered by the presence of a powerful peak
signal. [Ref. 34:p. 1177] PILOTS capability to detect small, non-metallic surface
vessels has also been tested. 3
3For complete details of test conditions and results see, Magnavox Signaal Systems Company,
PILOT Trial-Report, "Searching for the Limit", June 1989.
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(2) SCOUT. SCOUT is the Signaal equivalent of the Swedish
PILOT. It is a solid state FMCW radar, operating in I band, with a selectable
output power of 1 milliwatt to 1 Watt. [Ref. 35:p. 6] It has demonstrated the
ability to detect fast patrol boats (FPB) at a range of 15 nm, larger ships to the
radar horizon, and small wooden boats at 8 nm. [Ref. 35:p. 6]
D. ELECTRO-OPTIC SYSTEMS
Electro-optic (EO) systems utilize sensors to search various portions of the
frequency spectrum. IR sensors utilize the IR windows centered at 4um and
lOum and electro-optic systems utilize the visible portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum much the same wav as the human eye. They can be utilized to search
for, and track targets, and in the controlling of weapons directed against those
targets. EO systems are now being recognized as providing a vital alternative to
radar fire control when electronic silence has to be maintained. They may be
configured for "stand alone" operation or as an integral part of a fire control
radar. The majority of currently available systems employ IR and television
sensors, and utilize a laser to determine range to the target. The laser could also
be utilized in illuminating targets for laser guided munitions. EO systems are
manufactured by Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden,
Russia, Britain, and the United States.
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E. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
1. Definition
A 'command system' is often used to refer to a tactical computer
system which serves the command and control process. Because of the
ambiguous nature of the term command system', the term Combat Direction
System or CDS was introduced. A CDS is a computer or collection of computers,
organized into a system, which provide all the facilities for directing the fighting
capabilities of a warship. [Ref. 31:p. 96] This includes the ability for command
and control, but also covers the semi-autonomous computer sub-systems which
control each sensor and weapon.
2. Purpose
Tactical data-handling systems, or CDS, perform two related
functions. First, they integrate available sensor data into a meaningful tactical
picture, generally in the form of a 2-D plot of the sea and surrounding air area.
Such a plot includes some attempt to identify the occupants of that surrounding
area, at least in terms of friendly, enemy, or neutral.
Secondly, they often partially or completely automate the results of
decisions taken by means of the plot. For example, using an electronic plot, an
officer may designate a target for attack with one or more of the ships available
weapons. This designation at a console in the combat information center (CIC)
will result automatically in the proper orders being given to, say, the gun control
console. In some systems automation extends further. The combat system
identifies particularly urgent threats, based on sensed information and
previously incorporated instructions, and initiates reactions (such as launching
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chaff or firing missiles) against them. In such cases the display allows the
monitoring officer to abort the reaction while it is being made.
The need to integrate and automate command functions is a result of
the number and speed of available weapons and platforms. It may be that the
driver toward automation on smaller ships is primarily the need to limit
manpower while still taking advantage of external sources of data, such as data
links to shore and airborne radars.
The essence of any tactical situation is that it is dynamic, and therefore,
a system designed to aide the tactical decision maker must be able to display not
only instantaneous sensor data but also enough of the history of the movement of
any target to permit projection ahead. Integration of ESM and active-sensor data
may also be valuable as a means of identifying given tracks.
3. Fire Control Systems
Fire Control Systems (FCS) consist of the sensors (radar, sonar, electro-
optical) used to detect, acquire, track, and direct ordnance, and the associated
computers used to calculate proper aim points and correction of weapons. FCS
may be incorporated as part of a Tactical Data System, or operate completly
independently. The boundary between a highly automated FCS (which can be
fed by a command /control tactical data system) and a full command /control
system incorporating fire-control calculations is not very clear.
4. Centralized vs. Distributed
The terms centralized and distributed refer to the computer
architectural arrangement of the combat-direction system.
79
a. Centralized Systems
A fully centralized system is configured so that all data handling
and mathematical computations for fire control solutions are handled within a
central computer. The major advantage is that since both the tactical picture and
at least some of the system functions are bundled together in one machine, it can
(at least in theory) execute those functions very quickly to respond to a rapidly
developing tactical situation. This type of architecture has several major
disadvantages, however, including:
• the input/output channel of the picture-keeping computer is a choke
point whose capacity may be easy to exceed, given modern automatic-detection
radar systems;
• the more centralized the computer, the more seperate functions it must
perform on a time-shared basis. Ultimately there is only one processor to carry
out all the different functions;
• the computer itself is a point of vulnerability. If it dies, so does the
system; and
• highly centralized systems are not quickly modified.
Figure 5 is a simplified diagram of a centralised CDS. The British
ADAWS (Action Data Automation Weapons System) is an example of a
centralished CDS in which the central computer performs fire control
calculations as well as maintaining the tactical picture.
b. Federated Systems
A federated system is one in which the central computer is
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Figure 5 : Centralised Combat Direction System
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central computer handle much of the processing. Compared to a fully centralized
one, a federated system has a very important advantage. Each console can be
programmed independently, so new systems and new functions are relatively
easy to fit into the system. There are two distinct federated architectures. One is
star-like: the picture-keeper connects to a series of secondary machines, each of
which connects to particular sensors and/or weapons. The other is a linear or
ring-like combination of computers, each assigned a particular role, and all wired
tightly and directly together. The latter architecture is a step toward a fully
distributed system, but it is very different because of the tight relationship
between the computers in the network. In the latter case the key feature is that
messages are sent directly from computer to computer, without any intervening
data bus. Some messeages may have to pass through several computers (which
may not operate on them) before reaching the appropriate address. The effect of
a data bus, if it is combined with the appropriate software, is to seperate
messages and message handling from the main computers,
c. Distributed Systems
As minicomputers become more powerful, a greater degree of
distribution becomes attractive. There are two quite different distributed
architectures currently. In the first, weapons, sensors, and processors all ride a
common ship bus. Examples are the Hughes H930 and the Plessey NAUTIS
systems. Such a system has no bottlenecks at all. Each processor can execute any
function (e.g., track keeping or gun fire control), since all share the same stream
of data and messages. Figure 6 is a generic example of a distributed Combat
Direction System, and figure 7 is an example of a Hughes H930 Mod 4
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distributed system in current service, that systems described as distributed are
really no more than multiprocessor types in which the seperate processors are so
tightly connected that the failure of any one will disable the system as a whole.
[Ref. 7:p. 87]
The alternative is to arrange the processors in a local-area-
network (LAN), a special-purpose data bus. This bus in turn connects to the
weapon/sensor bus or busses. The LAN acts as a central computer complex; but
unlike a single-computer system, it degrades gracefully. Each machine in the
LAN carries its own version of the tactical picture, updated by actions taken by
the other processors (and transmitted within the LAN). Such a system has the
advantage that intra-LAN message traffic need not compete with the traffic along
the weapon and sensor busses, so picture updates can be quicker and more
complete. The major drawback to such a configuration is that the nodes at which
the LAN connects to the weapon/sensor bus(es) form points of vulnerability. The
LAN type of architecture is typified by the Dowty-SEMA SSCS (British) and by
the Contraves Cosys 200 (Swiss).
5. Current Systems
The vast majority of the current CDSs exported for corvette/light
frigate sized platforms is made within European countries. Italy and the
Netherlands produce the majority of the CDS systems exported, although France
and Britain also contribute. Systems such as Signaal's Sewaco series, Selenia's
IPN 10 and IPN 20 systems, Thompson-CSF's TAVITAC (Vega IIIC), BEAB's
(formerly PEAB) 9LV series, and Ferranti's CAAIS series of CDS systems are
widely exported. Newer systems appear to be taking advantage of improvements
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in computer computational power as more distributed and federated
architectures are appearing.
F. CONCLUSION
The number of producers of electronic equipment for naval vessels is
concentrated primarily within the Western European nations. These countries
produce the majority of the radar, fire control, and CDS systems currently
available for export. Countries such as Isreal, however, produce many of their
own electronic systems including radars, EW equipment, Optronics, and CDS.
The availability of equipment seems to be unlimited between producers and
consumers, as long as hard currency is available. An example of this is the
acquision of the Signaal STACOS CDS for the new Saudi Arabian corvettes.
Producers are taking advantage of advances in technology and are utilizing more
federated and fully distributed types of architecture in newer command data
systems. This distributed architecture, coupled with redundant data paths
greatly reduces the chance that a single hit will disrupt all combat functions. The
new Sa'ar 5 corvette for Israel is expected to be fitted with redundant command
data system communications paths and three locations onboard where all or
some command functions can be performed. [Ref. 16:p. 299]
Developments in LPI sensors, to include radars and EO search and track
systems is progressing and appears to have great utility. The development of
these systems is, like most others, concentrated within a reasonably small
number of countries. These systems by the nature of their operations will make it
more difficult to exploit the electro-magnetic spectrum against an adversary.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The future challenges facing U.S. naval forces, and the direction from
which those challenges might come are more uncertain now than anytime in
the last 40 years. Littoral disputes between countries over rights to natural
resources, humanitarian assistance, piracy on the high seas, and naval
quarantines to prevent the oceanic transport of dangerous materials are only
some of the challenges facing naval forces. The Navy of the United States,
designed during the Cold War, has been optimized to fight open ocean
warfare against the former Soviet Union. The future, however, is expected to
be contained not on the high seas, but in the littoral regions of other nations.
The number of producers of warships is expanding as a number of
countries in the Pacific Rim develop a shipbuilding capability, with the help
of the Western European countries. The number of producers of high
technology systems to equip those warships is not increasing as rapidly,
however. A limited number of countries, predominantly within the
European continent, continue to produce the majority of the high technology
weapons and electronics which are exported to other countries. The
unlimited distribution of high technology weapon systems and electronics
will likely mean that future naval confrontations will occur between
participants who are similarly equipped.
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A. CONCLUSIONS
Based upon an evaluation of the material the following conclusions are
presented.
The level of sophistication of small warships is increasing, mostly due to
the availability of equipment and technology from the Western European
countries. These countries have come to rely on exports in order to reduce
unit costs for equipment and ensure employment.
Without an identifiable threat which generates significant public
condemnation, manufacturers of high technology weapons and equipment
will continue to provide the best for those with hard currency.
The number of small fast attack craft in the inventories of smaller
navies is expected to remain high, however, many navies will acquire larger
corvettes and light frigate-size ships.
The concept of modular equipment modules and ships built with a
"fitted-for-but-not-with" approach will become more prevalent. This will
make ships more flexible in their capabilities, and make it more difficult to
"know" how a ship is equipped at any given time.
Ship characteristic signatures are expected to become more "stealthy",
due to improvements in hull design, LPI communications and radars,
passive sensors, and acoustic quieting techniques.
Anti-ship missiles will continue to be the "weapon-of-choice" for surface
warships. New designs will likely be supersonic, will take advantage of
advanced technologies including low observable shapes and materials and
passive or LPI seekers. Additionally, they will likely incorporate high-G
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terminal maneuvers to avoid defensive systems.
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